

AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

Angola

I. Summary:

Angola does not suffer from significant drug production or abuse; however, some cannabis is cultivated and consumed locally and some illegal drugs transit Angola, particularly cocaine from Brazil to South Africa. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the trafficking problem is growing. Angolan counternarcotics officials reported seizures of both cocaine and cannabis during the year. Angola is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. However, it is the only Southern African Development Community (SADC) member not a signatory to the SADC counternarcotics protocol.

II. Status of Country

Angola is not a major center of drug production, money laundering, or production of precursor chemicals, and is not likely to become one. Nevertheless, the police continued to seize cocaine and cannabis in 2003, and anecdotal evidence suggests that trafficking is increasing. During the year, the Government gave increasing coverage to drug seizures and arrests in the official media. Following the end of Angola's civil conflict in April 2002, border controls were relaxed. Now authorities have tightened border controls to prevent trafficking activity.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Angola is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but it is not a signatory of the SADC counternarcotics protocol. Cases of public corruption connected to narcotics trafficking are rare. However, at least three counternarcotics officials suspected in the disappearance of cocaine seized in an earlier operation were arrested and were facing charges at the end of the year.

Although Angola has enacted legislation mandating treatment for those convicted of narcotics abuse, there are no public treatment centers available. Angola cooperates with South Africa in fighting the flow of cocaine from Angola to South Africa, and South Africa has offered training and equipment to the Angolan police. Angola also cooperates on a regional basis via SADC, despite its not having signed the drug protocol.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The Road Ahead. In 2003, for the first time, 12 Angolan police officers participated in a State Department-sponsored regional training course, which included segments on counternarcotics. The Angolan government has expressed interest in receiving additional law enforcement training.

Botswana

I. Summary

Botswana is not a major producer of illicit drugs or precursor chemicals, and it is not a significant drug-transit country. Isolated pockets of marijuana cultivation occur, but efforts to suppress cultivation keep production levels low. Botswana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and partners with the U.S. as host of Africa's International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA).

II. Status of Country

Cannabis remains the drug of choice for local consumption due to its low price. In 2003 there was a slight increase in the overall amount of cannabis seized, all of it intended for domestic consumption, according to police. Compared to 2002, there was a slight decrease in the number of seizures of recreational drugs transiting Botswana. Botswana is not a drug trafficking site, although drug control officials remain alert concerning drug trafficking and abuse.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. The Government of Botswana (GOB) created a National Drug Control Council (NDCC), chaired by the Office of the President, in 1998. Its overall functions include defining, promoting and coordinating policy on the control of drug abuse, trafficking and related activities. The NDCC submitted a draft master plan in 2003, which is awaiting GOB approval.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The Drugs and Related Substance Act imposes a penalty of BWP 1000 (\$235) or three months imprisonment for possession of less than 60 grams of cannabis; possession for more than 60 grams carries a fine of BWP 1,500 (\$350) or a jail sentence of a year or more. Generally, few of the cases in which individuals were arrested for cannabis use actually proceed to the trial stage. The authorities prefer leniency to strict pursuit of punishment in the case of individual abuse.

But in October 2003, a Francistown court sentenced a person found with ten bags of cannabis (a quantity presumably for trafficking) to three years in prison.

The number of seizures of drugs decreased slightly in 2003. In an October 2003 interview, a senior police superintendent noted that during the first six months of 2003, 187 persons had been arrested for dealing or possessing cannabis. By the end of 2003, 213 cases of seizure of cannabis had taken place. One case of arrest for cocaine (1.77 grams) had occurred, one arrest for methaqualone (5 tablets) and two seizures of ecstasy (MDMA) involving 32 tablets had occurred.

Agreements and Treaties. Botswana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Botswana has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and two of its Protocols.

Drug Flow/Transit. The hard drugs are carried into Botswana via the Republic of South Africa; cannabis frequently comes in through Zimbabwe or Zambia. There is no intelligence suggesting that drugs are transiting Botswana in significant quantities. The EU in conjunction with UNODC (United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) has provided drug detection dogs to Botswana for use in drug searches.

Corruption. As a matter of government policy and practice, Botswana does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug

transactions. There are no indications of senior government officials being involved in drug-related corruption.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. In 2003 the ILEA, based in Botswana, offered four Law Enforcement Executive Programs to approximately 170 law enforcement officers from 16 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Botswana. During the six-week program students were taught by a number of U.S. law enforcement agencies, including DEA and the Secret Service. DEA presented a week-long course of instruction on many aspects of drug enforcement technique. Course material covered case initiation, drug trafficking trends, drug tracking trends, drug identification, evidence collection, drug testing, interviewing and interrogation, use of informants, undercover operations, international controlled deliveries, and team raids and planning.

The Road Ahead. The USG deeply appreciates the assistance and support of the GOB in connection with the ILEA, and anticipates continuing cooperation with the GOB to assure that Botswana, the South African Development Community region and the rest of Africa continue to benefit from the ILEA's programs.

Burkina Faso

I. Summary

Though Burkina Faso is not a major source, destination, or transit country for drugs, there is growing concern about and awareness of drug abuse generally. Policy and enforcement authorities take their responsibilities in this domain seriously, but must work with limited means to address issues as they arise. Usage, transit and production are mostly limited to cannabis. Most trafficked drug products come from neighboring Ghana and also from Nigeria. Burkina Faso is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

There is growing concern over the abuse of cannabis and synthetic drugs in Burkina Faso. According to the police, an estimated 20 percent of young people have tried marijuana or other illicit drugs. Customs officials seized over 800 kilograms of cannabis in 2002. Investigations stemming from the seizures resulted in the conviction of approximately 280 people who received punishments ranging from a three-month to a five-year prison term. The 2003 statistics for drug seizure, drug-related convictions and punishments were not available by year's end. Most of the marijuana cultivated in Burkina Faso is intended for domestic consumption.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. With the encouragement and monetary support of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), an inter-ministerial National Committee to Fight Against Drugs has been in place since 1993. This committee has a permanent secretariat and gathers together representatives of the various ministries involved in counternarcotics efforts. The committee is currently chaired by the Minister of Security. Lacking a reliable assessment of the status of drug trafficking, use, and production in Burkina Faso, the drug control committee established in 2002 a panel of experts to conduct a preliminary study and to produce a proposal for further research. The committee did not start the study by year's end because the GOBF was yet to approve of \$100,000 budget for the study. The committee had been hoping to have its first regional office established in southern Burkina Faso by the end of 2003, but funding problems prevented this from happening. This office would help coordinate at a regional level the efforts of the agencies that work on drug interdiction efforts.

Agreements and Treaties. Burkina Faso is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. Although limited by a lack of resources, the GOBF has endeavored to meet the goals of the 1988 UN Drug Convention wherever possible. The creation and continued activity of the National Committee to Fight Against Drugs is indicative of the GOBF's efforts in this regard. Burkina Faso has signed and ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its two Protocols.

Corruption. Corruption is endemic throughout the poorer countries of Africa, including Burkina. The government in Burkina punishes corruption when encountered. The USG is not aware of any narcotics-related corruption at senior levels in the government of Burkina Faso.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S. has no current narcotics-related initiatives planned for Burkina.

The Road Ahead. Burkina is not an important transit country for drugs. Should there be any sign of increased use of Burkina for trafficking in hard drugs, the U.S. has regional programs that could respond. However, for the moment, there are no plans for narcotics assistance programs in Burkina.

Côte d'Ivoire

I. Summary

Côte d'Ivoire remains a transit point for narcotics trafficking from Asia and Latin America to Europe and to some degree, North America. Drug production in Côte is limited to cannabis. Domestic consumption of cannabis, which is rising, constitutes by far the most important current drug-related concern for authorities. The September 2002 political/military crisis, which split the country in two, created additional opportunities for trafficking in drugs, money and merchandise in the rebel-occupied zones and hampered efforts to meet overall counternarcotics goals. The national law enforcement apparatus effectively disappeared in conflict areas. In spite of this situation, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire (GOCI) continues modest, but not insignificant efforts to combat drug abuse and illicit trafficking of narcotics and psychotropic substances. The Department of Drug and Narcotics Police (DPSD) is the leading agency for fighting narcotics trafficking. Côte d'Ivoire is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Abidjan is a major West African financial center and a regional hub for international airline travel and shipping. After the attempted coup and armed rebellion in September 2002, Côte was effectively split into rebel-controlled and government areas. Côte d'Ivoire experienced a sharp increase in trafficking of smuggled goods, money and drugs from the rebel-held zones through the porous northern and western border posts controlled by opposition forces to neighboring countries. In 2003, police seized increased quantities of cannabis, heroin and ephedrine in Abidjan. Controlled pharmaceuticals were also seized. Among the 884 People arrested, many were non- Côte West African nationals. Ivoirians, however, still constitute the majority of arrestees for trafficking. To date, 645 of those arrested have been prosecuted. Trafficking in cocaine remains relatively rare.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. Côte d'Ivoire narcotics officials are drafting a new omnibus narcotics law in compliance with the provisions of the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Accomplishments. The DPSD has opened three new regional offices in the interior of the country in an effort to improve police/citizen relations. One-hundred seventeen new police officers underwent special training in counternarcotics detection/investigation tactics in 2003. The police also launched a drug awareness campaign targeted on higher education students.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The lack of central government authority and police and customs presence in rebel-controlled areas disrupted counternarcotics law enforcement efforts. Nevertheless, cannabis seizures increased sharply, reflecting expanded cannabis cultivation.

Corruption. Corruption is endemic in many poor countries, like Côte. Given the recent political turmoil, it is a reasonable assumption that corruption facilitates narcotics trafficking to some extent.

Agreements and Treaties. Côte d'Ivoire is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Drug Flow/Transit. Abidjan's Houphouët-Boigny International airport remains a transit point for cocaine and heroin from Latin America and Asia to Europe and beyond. Other key points where drugs enter Côte are the seaports in Abidjan and San Pedro, Côte's second port city, after Abidjan. Drugs and other illicit goods also cross borders clandestinely by boat and vehicle.

Domestic programs (Demand Reduction). Public awareness of the social effects of drug abuse remains low.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. U.S. policy goals in Côte d'Ivoire are geared to encourage improved law enforcement to keep Côte d'Ivoire from becoming a transit point for narcotics trafficking.

The Road Ahead. National drug police experts are concerned that consumption of drugs by youth and child soldiers during Côte's recent turmoil will make it difficult to re-integrate them into society. They fear that such youth could become involved in theft to continue to feed their drug habits. GOCI authorities believe that the civil strife in Côte may increase criminal activity, undermine an already weak judicial system, and foster increased corruption among the police and the army. They fear it could become easier for traffickers and criminal organizations to operate in Cote.

Egypt

I. Summary

The Arab Republic of Egypt is not a major producer, supplier, or consumer of narcotics or precursor chemicals. Heroin and cannabis are transported through Egypt, but levels have not risen in three years. A 2003 study conducted by the Government of Egypt showed that the narcotics problem costs the Egyptian economy approximately \$800 million annually, including the amounts spent on illegal drugs and what the government spends to combat the problem. The Anti-Narcotics General Administration (ANGA), the main counternarcotics organization in Egypt, is competent and progressive, and it cooperates fully with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) office in Cairo. Egypt is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Egypt is not a significant producer or consumer of narcotics or precursor chemicals, despite the fact that opium and cannabis plants are grown here. The substances that are most commonly abused are cannabis, which is known here as “bango,” and legitimate pharmaceuticals. Narcotics do pass through Egypt. Egypt's long and mostly uninhabited borders, combined with the high level of shipping passing through the Suez Canal, have made Egypt prone to the transshipment of Asian heroin. Other types of narcotics periodically pass through Cairo International Airport. The narcotics are destined primarily for Western Europe, with only small amounts headed to the United States. Transshipment has diminished considerably in recent years due to the elevation of security in Egypt and the region as a whole.

The ANGA is the oldest counternarcotics unit in the Arab world. It has jurisdiction over all criminal matters pertaining to narcotics and maintains offices in all major Egyptian cities and ports of entry. The U.S. DEA office in Egypt has a superb relationship with ANGA, which is open, cooperative, and receptive to ideas and training. DEA assists ANGA in interdiction operations in the Suez Canal Zone and at Cairo International Airport, and crop eradication operations in the Sinai Peninsula and Upper Egypt. It also has funded and conducted training for ANGA officers at regional counternarcotics courses in Nairobi, Kenya and provided in-country training on airport interdiction and chemical controls. Despite limited resources, ANGA has demonstrated continual improvements in its capabilities.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

The Government of Egypt (GOE) continues to aggressively pursue a comprehensive drug control strategy that was developed in 1998. ANGA, the Egyptian Ministry of Interior, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and select military units all cooperate in task forces designed to interdict narcotics shipments. Government and private sector demand reduction efforts exist but are hampered by financial constraints and logistical challenges.

Accomplishments. With the passage of the first anti-money laundering law in 2002, which criminalized the laundering of proceeds derived from trafficking in narcotics and numerous other crimes, seizures of currency in drug related cases rose by fifty percent to over 3,000,000 Egyptian Pounds (\$487,000). In 2003, Egypt's Council for Combating and Treating Addiction (see more on this organization below) concluded a three-year study of the narcotics problem, and found that narcotics cost the country approximately five billion Egyptian pounds annually. Of this amount, ninety-two

percent is money spent by users to buy narcotics and the remaining eight percent is government money spent on counternarcotics programs.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Internal security and combating terrorism are the major foci of Egyptian law enforcement efforts. Despite these priorities, ANGA is able to operate an effective program against narcotics trafficking. It investigates and targets significant drug traffickers, intercepts narcotics shipments, and detects and eradicates illegal crops. Large-scale seizures and arrests are rare, primarily because Egypt does not have a significant narcotics market or narcotics abuse culture. ANGA does operate its own drug awareness campaign in addition to other government and private sector demand reduction programs. ANGA's Eradication Unit conducts monthly operations against cannabis and opium crops in the Sinai. We do not have statistics yet, but anecdotal evidence indicates that the amount of illegal crops seized during 2003 was less than that seized in 2002. Drug seizures in 2002 included cannabis (59,282 kilograms), hashish (1080 kilograms), and smaller amounts of heroin, opium, psychotropic drugs, and cocaine. Significant amounts of prescription and "designer" drugs such as ecstasy (85,849 tablets), amphetamines, and codeine were also seized. During the course of 2002, Egyptian law enforcement officials eradicated 162.8 hectares of cannabis and 14.4 hectares opium poppy plants.

Corruption. There does not appear to be serious narcotics-related corruption in Egypt. Only low-level local police officials have been identified and arrested. The GOE has strict laws and harsh penalties for government officials convicted of involvement in narcotics trafficking or related activities.

Agreements And Treaties. Egypt and the United States have had an extradition treaty in place since the 1860's. Egypt has been a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention since 1991. Egypt also is a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 protocol amending the Single Convention. The U.S.-Egypt Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty entered into force on November 29, 2001. Egypt has signed but not ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cultivation and Production. Cannabis is grown year round in the northern and southern Sinai and in Upper Egypt, while opium poppy is grown in the southern Sinai only from November through March. Rugged terrain means that plots of illegal crops are small and irregularly shaped. ANGA combats this production by using aerial observation and confidential informants to identify illegal plots. Once the crops are located, ANGA conducts daylight eradication operations that consist of cutting and burning the plants. ANGA has yet to implement a planned herbicide eradication program. No heroin processing laboratories have been discovered in Egypt in the last 13 years and no evidence is available indicating that opiates or cannabis grown in Egypt reach the United States in sufficient quantities to have a significant impact.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). In 2003, the National Council for Combating and Treating Addiction continued to be the GOE's focal point for domestic demand reduction programs. The Council is an inter-ministerial group chaired by the Prime Minister and has the participation of ten ministries. The group espouses a three-pronged strategy to counter the demand for narcotics: awareness, treatment (including detoxification and social/psychological treatment), and rehabilitation. The group's efforts over the past year included a range of activities, including a media advertising campaign with participation from First Lady Suzanne Mubarak, seminars at Al-Azhar University on Islam and narcotics, and the establishment of a drug treatment hotline and website. Additionally, the Council sponsors four rehabilitation centers, mostly located in the Cairo metropolitan area. In 2002, these centers received 4,131 requests from addicts for help compared to 5,531 in 2001.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S. counternarcotics policy in Egypt is to engage the GOE in a bilateral program to reduce narcotics transshipments and decrease opium poppy and cannabis cultivation. The policy includes the following specific objectives: Increase training to ANGA and other government offices responsible for narcotics enforcement; assist with the identification of illegal crop eradication targets; Improve narcotics interdiction methodology; improve intelligence collection and analysis.

The Road Ahead. In fiscal year 2004, the U.S. Government plans to provide additional training in drug interdiction, anticorruption measures, border control operations, and chemical identification and control. The DEA country office will continue to work closely with ANGA to improve interdiction and eradication techniques and to develop additional sources of information on trafficking and production.

Ethiopia

I. Summary

Ethiopia does not play a major role in the production of illicit narcotics or precursor chemicals associated with the drug trade. Ethiopia is strategically located along a major narcotics transit route between Southwest Asian heroin production and European markets and West African trafficking networks. Cannabis is grown in Ethiopia, but most is consumed in rural areas of Ethiopia itself. Seizures in 2001 indicate that opium poppy is being grown in Ethiopia, but only in a few small plots. More heroin is transiting Ethiopia for markets in West Africa, Europe, and the United States. Nigerian traffickers are active in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Counternarcotics Unit (ECNU) maintains an interdiction team at Bole International Airport, where the ECNU uses its two drug sniffer dogs to examine, with a degree of randomness, cargo and luggage. The ECNU routinely screens passengers, luggage, and cargo on flights arriving from “high risk” origins, i.e., Bangkok, New Delhi, Mumbai, and Islamabad. Ethiopia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Ethiopia is not now, and is not likely to become, a significant producer of narcotic drugs or precursor chemicals. A small volume of cannabis is produced, of which a small portion is being produced for export, primarily to neighboring countries; the majority is consumed at home, but absolute quantities in both cases are moderate. For the first time, in 2001, opium poppy was seized at two locations where it was apparently being grown as an experimental crop. No further seizures have been reported. Indications are that the techniques for growing the opium came from India and that the appearance of these apparent experimental plots may be explained by a downturn in coffee prices. No opium gum has been found yet.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

The use of heroin and other hard drugs remains quite low, due primarily to the high street price and limited availability of such drugs. To the extent these hard drugs are available, it is in large part due to the “spillover” effect from the transiting of drug couriers through Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa. Bole is a major air hub for flight connections between Southeast and Southwest Asia and Africa, and much of the heroin entering and/or transiting Ethiopia comes from Asia according to Ethiopian authorities. Many of the flights require up to a two-day layover in Addis, permitting an opportunity for the introduction of these drugs into the local market.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The ECNU has improved upon its performance in 2002. It has changed leadership and been more proactive at the federal level. The ECNU is being expanded from 50 to 150 police and will be doing some border road interdiction efforts as well as its work at the airport. The interdiction unit has improved its ability to identify male Nigerian/Tanzanian drug “mules” who traditionally swallow drugs to smuggle them.

Corruption. There is no evidence of government corruption relating to illicit drugs. The Anti-Corruption Commission, created in May 2001, was given substantial police powers to investigate corruption, and for a short while attracted considerable attention with some high profile cases. Since then the Commission seems to have become bogged down bureaucratically and is less effective than expected. However, in 2001 and 2002, the Ethiopian government arrested and charged high-level government officials for corruption unrelated to drugs, and it is likely the government would address drug-related corruption in the same way.

Agreements and Treaties. Ethiopia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention. Ethiopia has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The United States is trying to raise the profile of crime-related issues and encourage criminalization of money laundering. A U.S. Treasury advisor to the Central Bank has been providing advice to the Ministry of Justice on drafting money-laundering legislation. A draft of new money-laundering legislation is now pending in Parliament.

The focus of U.S. programs remains on the law enforcement side, specifically the ECNU. State Department narcotics assistance supports curriculum advice and training for Police Academy instructors in drug investigations. The objective is to “institutionalize” training, ensuring that courses will be repeatedly offered by Ethiopian trainers, rather than relying on return visits by DEA trainers from the U.S.

The Road Ahead. Ethiopia is likely to remain a minor trafficking center for Africa because of its airport and the flight arrangements described above. The GOE has an excellent plan for using U.S. narcotics assistance to maximum effect and cooperation with the U.S. has been good.

Gambia

I. Summary

The Gambia does not have significant drug production, trafficking or use. However, cannabis is cultivated and consumed locally. The Gambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

The Gambia is not a major center of drug production, trafficking, money laundering or production of precursor chemicals. Despite the fact that the counternarcotics squad of the national police has very limited resources, the police, together with military personnel, continued to seize large amounts of cannabis throughout the country in 2003. The National Drug Control Council (NDCC) coordinates The Gambia's fight against drug use and trafficking.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. The Government of The Gambia has strict legislation against drug production, drug trafficking and money laundering, whether associated with the drug trade, terrorism or other illicit activity. The incidence of drug related offenses is still relatively low in the country. Gambian courts impose stiff mandatory sentences and fines, depending on the quantities involved.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Alarmed by the increased use of marijuana in the country, particularly in the tourism development area, the police counternarcotics squad, in collaboration with the national army, conducted a series of raids in furtherance of The Gambia's "War on Drugs." In December 2003 the police raided some youth gatherings in Brikama town and arrested more than 15 dealers who were reportedly trafficking in hard drugs in the area. In September, police in the provincial town of Farafenni reported that drug trafficking and consumption was on the rise in the northern part of the country. Some drug traffickers in the town were raided and large quantities of cannabis found in their possession. Also during the same month, a series of raids along the beach from Senegambia to Palma Rima (tourism development area) highlighted the government's determination to fight drug trafficking and use. A group of marijuana smokers were arrested along the beach after a tip-off from an informant. The police also conducted a nationwide counternarcotics campaign in May, coinciding with the 22nd anniversary of the death of Reggae artist Bob Marley. Men from the drug squad rounded up at least a dozen suspected cannabis dealers and smokers in different neighborhoods of Serrekunda, Bakau and Lamin. Similar arrests were also reported in other parts of the country on the same day.

Over 600 drug traffickers were charged and prosecuted in the courts in 2002, the last year for which statistics are available; and 1,232 kilograms of prohibited cannabis were destroyed by the NDCC that year.

Corruption. As a matter of government policy and practice, The Gambia does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

Treaties and Agreements. The Gambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The Road Ahead. The Gambia will continue its tough policies on drugs, and the U.S. will stand ready to cooperate with The Gambia in this effort.

Ghana

I. Summary

Ghana takes steps to combat illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and has mounted major efforts against drug abuse. It has active enforcement, treatment, and rehabilitation programs; however, lack of resources remains a problem. Ghana-U.S. law enforcement coordination continued in 2003, and Ghana's law enforcement agencies took steps to deepen interagency coordination. Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Ghana is increasingly a transit point for illegal drugs, particularly cocaine from South America and heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia. Europe remains the major destination, but drugs also flow to South Africa and to North America. Accra's Kotoka International Airport is increasingly a focus for traffickers. Ports at Tema and Sekondi are also used, and border posts at Aflao (Togo) and Elubo and Sampa (Cote d'Ivoire) see significant traffic. Nigerian traffickers continue to strengthen their presence in Ghana as it becomes a major transportation hub. Trafficking has also fueled increasing domestic consumption. Cannabis use is increasing in Ghana, as is local cultivation. The government has mounted significant public education programs, as well as cannabis crop substitution programs. Production of precursor chemicals is not a major problem.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. The Narcotics Control Board (NCB) coordinates government efforts involving counternarcotics activities. These activities include enforcement and control, education, prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and social re-integration. The NCB's counternarcotics national strategy, the "National Plan of Action 1999-2003", was never implemented due to lack of funding. However, the UN office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) agreed to finance three demand reduction projects selected from the National Plan of Action: train 110 Ghana Education Service counselors (one per district in the country) on drug abuse prevention; work with the Department of Social Welfare to provide vocational training to those completing drug treatment programs; and produce a drug education guide for teachers throughout the country. Each year since 1999, the NCB has proposed to amend the 1990 narcotics law to allow stricter application of bail bond system (i.e., no general granting of bail when flight is a real possibility; higher sureties to assure that defendants appear for trial) and to fund NCB operations using a portion of seized proceeds, but the Attorney General's office has not acted on these proposals.

Accomplishments. Comparing seizure data from the first three quarters of 2002 and 2003 (only January-September 2003 figures are available) reveals that quantities of cocaine and cannabis seized have increased, and the number of persons arrested with heroin and cannabis has also increased. The amount of heroin seized has decreased and number of persons arrested with cocaine has remained the same. The NCB and other law enforcement agencies continued their successful cooperation with U.S. law enforcement agencies in 2003, sharing information as well as rendering an American citizen and extraditing a Ghanaian citizen to be tried in the United States for narcotics offenses. In October, the NCB cooperated with British authorities to coordinate a controlled delivery of cocaine that British officials discovered on a container ship from Guyana bound for Ghana. The controlled delivery resulted in the arrest of three traffickers, who were later granted bail by the courts. (See below on bail policy and conviction rates.)

The NCB's national drug education efforts continued in schools and churches, heightening citizens' awareness of the fight against narcotics and traffickers. On June 26, the NCB organized Ghana's National Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, with sponsorship from private companies such as Western Union, and the Agricultural Development Bank, under the theme "Let's talk about drugs." From March 17-21, over 40 officials from Ghana Post Company Limited, Ghana Police Service, the NCB and the Customs, Excise, and Preventive Service (CEPS) attended training on ways to enhance inter-agency cooperation to combat drug trafficking and money laundering in the postal system.

Law Enforcement Efforts. In 2003, Ghanaian law enforcement agencies continued to conduct joint police-NCB operations against narcotics cultivators, traffickers, and abusers. NCB agents, who are not armed, rely upon the police's Criminal Investigative Division's (CID) narcotics unit in situations requiring armed force. For example, in November, a joint NCB-police operation seized approximately two metric tons of cannabis worth cedis 1.5 billion (\$172,414) and arrested seven people in the Brong-Ahafo Region. The NCB continued to work with DHL and Federal Express to intercept packages containing narcotics.

The NCB reports a slight drop in the prices of cocaine, heroin and cannabis from 2002. In 2003, a gram of cocaine sold for cedis 133,350 (\$15.30) compared to cedis 165,000 (approximately \$20) in 2002. A gram of heroin sold for cedis 173,550 (\$20) compared to cedis 200,000 (approximately \$25) in 2002. The price of a kilogram of cannabis dropped slightly from approximately cedis 40,000 (approximately \$5.00) in 2002 to approximately cedis 20,000-32,000 (\$2.30-\$3.67) in 2003. A wrap or joint sells at cedis 500-1,000 (\$0.06-0.11).

Corruption. Despite the consistent number of arrests of suspected narcotics traffickers, Ghana has an extremely low rate of conviction, which law enforcement officials indicate is likely due to corruption within the judicial system. Of 15 high profile cases in 2003, 12 suspects have been granted bail, two have been remanded in prison custody pending a trial and only one suspect has been convicted and jailed. Of 23 high profile 2002 cases that went to court, 21 suspects were granted bail (11 of whom fled the country), one person escaped from custody, while only one was convicted and jailed.

NCB officials complain that courts often release suspected smugglers, including foreign nationals, on bail that is often set at only a tiny fraction of the value of the drugs found in a suspect's possession. The court requirement of a surety in addition to bail is often either dropped, or court registrars will fraudulently use the identical property as surety for multiple cases. In at least one case, when the NCB requested that the details of a suspected fraudulent surety be investigated before releasing a suspect on bail, the judge threatened the officer with prosecution for "denying justice."

In 2003, there were cases of possible evidence tampering and also, arraignment of police officers for taking bribes from drug traffickers. In February, a Ghanaian man died after ingesting 70 pellets of heroin, one of which burst in his stomach. The organization responsible for issuing the toxicology report, the Ghana Standards Board, at first did not receive all of the pellets for analysis. Upon request, the pellets were delivered, but the Standards Board discovered that the packaging had been improperly sealed and possibly tampered with, that the chain of custody was in doubt, and that two of the pellets had been replaced with salt. Because of the poor handling of the evidence, the Police CID could not make a determination whether the heroin had been replaced with salt before being given to the deceased, or after being retrieved by police officers, and therefore closed the investigation.

In August, four police officers were arraigned and charged with taking bribes from drug traffickers in October 2001. The case was ongoing at year's end.

Agreements and Treaties. Ghana is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. U.S.-Ghana extradition relations are governed by the 1931 U.S.-U.K.

Extradition Treaty, to which Ghana acceded at independence. Additionally, Ghana is a party to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Protocol Agreement, which includes an extradition provision among member states. In December, Ghana signed a bilateral Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement with the United States.

Cultivation and Production. Cannabis (also known as Indian hemp) is widely cultivated in rural farmlands. The Volta, Brong-Ahafo, Western, and Ashanti regions are principal growing areas. Most is consumed locally; some is trafficked to neighboring and European countries. Cannabis is usually harvested in September and October, and law enforcement teams increase their surveillance and investigation efforts at these times. In 2003, combined NCB and police teams continued to investigate production and distribution, and to destroy cultivated cannabis farms and plants.

In February 2003, the NCB implemented a pilot program designed to reduce the area under cultivation, under which 140 marijuana cultivators volunteered to give up marijuana in exchange for government assistance with planting and processing new food crops and immunity from prosecution. The NCB plans to expand the program next year to an additional 120 farmers that have registered for assistance.

Drug Flow/Transit. Cocaine and heroin are the main drugs that transit Ghana. Cocaine is sourced mainly from South America and destined for Europe, while heroin comes mainly from Southeast and Southwest Asia on its way to Europe and North America. Cannabis is shipped primarily to Europe, specifically to the United Kingdom. Narcotics are sometimes repackaged in Ghana for reshipment, and the most recent trend in concealment method is in carry-on, wheeled luggage.

While in absolute terms, drugs transiting Ghana do not yet contribute significantly to the supply of drugs to the U.S. market, Accra is an increasingly important transshipment point from Africa. Direct flights from Accra play an important role in the transshipment of heroin to the U.S. by West African trafficking organizations. In the past year, however, the NCB reports that narcotics air transit through Ghana has reduced somewhat in favor of land routes to Abidjan, largely due to the instability in Cote d'Ivoire, which creates more favorable conditions there for narcotics traffickers.

Domestic Programs. The NCB works with schools, professional training institutions, churches, local governments, and the general public to reduce local consumption. The Ministries of Health and Education further coordinate their efforts through their representatives on the Board. Board Members and staff frequently host public lectures, participate in radio discussion programs, and encourage newspaper articles on the dangers of drug abuse and trafficking. Ghana's National Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking was celebrated on June 26, in Kpando, Volta Region under the theme, "Let's talk about drugs." Although treatment programs have lagged behind preventative education and enforcement due to lack of funding, there are three government psychiatric hospitals receiving drug patients, and three private facilities in Accra, run by local NGOs, also assisting drug abusers.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Goals and Objectives. The USG's counternarcotics and anticrime goals in Ghana are to strengthen Ghanaian law enforcement capacity generally, to improve interdiction capacities, to enhance the NCB's office and field operation functions, and to reduce Ghana's role as a transit point for narcotics.

Bilateral Cooperation. In 2002, the United States provided the Government of Ghana with \$84,000 worth of counternarcotics assistance in the form of surveillance and detection equipment, including two narcotics detection devices ("Itemizers") installed at Kotoka International Airport in December 2003. Similar equipment funded in FY 2000 and FY 2001 is effectively maintained and has facilitated a number of drug arrests and seizures. FY2002 funding provided training for the Police and CEPS to

create Internal Affairs Units, which will assist in suppressing corruption and strengthening their capacity to interdict illegal drugs.

The Road Ahead. Improved narcotics interdiction, investigative capabilities, and prosecutorial successes sum up the USG's major policy goals. A focus on improved oversight of financial transactions is a particular concern, given the potential for any narcotics financial networks to be used by terrorist organizations.

Jordan

I. Summary

Jordan remains primarily a transit country for illicit drugs because of its geographical location between drug producing countries to the north and drug consuming countries to the south and west. In the past Jordanians themselves neither produced nor consumed significant amounts of illicit drugs. However, Jordanian authorities have noted an increase in the use of illicit drugs in Jordan. The primary drug of choice in Jordan is heroin smuggled in from Turkey. The target consumers are young university and high school-aged students. Although the amounts believed to be consumed are still relatively small in comparison to other countries, the authorities are concerned about the direction this new trend is taking. Cooperation with neighboring countries, particularly Lebanon and Syria, is ongoing and growing. Conversely, cooperation with Israel is decreasing due to the continuing violence in the West Bank. Jordan is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Jordan continues to be a transit country for narcotics, and remains vulnerable to illicit drug smuggling through its vast desert borders.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. In response to the increased usage of heroin among school and university aged individuals, Jordanian authorities have launched a wide spread awareness campaign in an attempt to educate young people of the perils of drug use. Authorities continue to provide hundreds of educational presentations in schools and universities throughout the country.

Law Enforcement. PSD statistics indicate a marked increase in heroin seizures and officials are clearly concerned with an increase in heroin usage, especially in the more affluent area of Aqaba, Ramtha and West Amman. Officials report that although the usage of heroin is still well below that of other countries, the trend is towards increased abuse, and they are concerned about the future.

Corruption. Jordanian officials report no narcotic related corruption or corruption investigations for the reporting period. There is currently no evidence to suggest that senior level officials are involved in narcotics trafficking.

Agreements and Treaties. Jordan remains committed to existing bilateral agreements providing for counternarcotics cooperation between Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan and Hungary. Jordan is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention

Cultivation and Production. Existing laws prohibit the cultivation and/or production of narcotics in Jordan. These laws have been effectively enforced, and there is as a result only negligible illegal cultivation in Jordan.

Drug Flow and Transit. Jordan has been and remains primarily a narcotics transit country. Jordan is bordered by narcotics producing countries to the north and narcotics consuming countries to the south and west. Jordan's primary challenge in stemming the flow of narcotics through the country remains the remote and open borders with neighboring countries. While law enforcement officials confirm substantial cooperation with its neighbors, the desolate border regions and the nomadic tribes associated with the trafficking of narcotics (with a centuries old tradition of smuggling as a principal source of income) make interdiction extremely difficult. None of the narcotics transiting Jordan is believed to be destined for the United States. Primary focus and concern remain the control and

policing of the open borders between all its neighbors. To date, Jordanian authorities have seen no transit of narcotics across the Iraqi border since the war ended. However, PSD officials continue to monitor the situation.

Domestic Programs. Jordanian authorities are focused on awareness and education, interdiction and rehabilitation. Jordanian officials have instituted a robust awareness program largely in response to the apparent increase in heroin use. Jordanian authorities are also increasing rehabilitation abilities. With United Nations assistance, Jordan is modernizing its drug treatment centers to include private hospitals.

Cultural and religious norms help to control drug use. The counternarcotics unit works in conjunction with the Ministry of Muslim affairs and holy places, which directs sermons, lessons and lectures on awareness of drugs and their effects.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Policy Initiatives. Creating an effective Jordanian interdiction force remains a primary goal of U.S.-Jordan cooperation. DEA is currently planning a narcotics training course to be conducted in Jordan in march 2004.

Bilateral cooperation. DEA country attaché in Cyprus and the U.S. Embassy in Jordan have a close working relationship with Jordanian authorities on narcotics related matters.

The Road Ahead. U.S. officials expect continued cooperation with Jordanian officials in counternarcotics related issues.

Iran

I. Summary

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a major transit route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan and through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Russia, and Europe. There is no evidence that narcotics transiting Iran reach the United States in an amount sufficient to have a significant effect on the United States. Iran is no longer a major drug producing country. An extensive 1998 U.S. survey, and a follow-up survey in 1999, concluded that the amount of opium poppy cultivation in Iran was negligible. An office of the UNODC in Iran has also repeatedly assured the international community that poppies are not cultivated in Iran. Iran remains an important transit country especially for opiates and hashish, although trafficking routes for opiates from Afghanistan to Russia and beyond, by way of Central Asia, have grown in importance.

There is overwhelming evidence of Iran's strong commitment to keep drugs moving out of Afghanistan from reaching its citizens. As Iran strives to achieve this goal, it certainly also prevents drugs from reaching markets in the West.

Opium addiction in Iran has long historical roots, and it is a major social and health problem for the Islamic Republic's Government. The Iranian Government (GOI) estimates that about two percent of Iran's 67.7 million citizens (that is, about 1,354,000 people) are regular drug abusers (drug-dependent addicts), but many respected observers of drug abuse worldwide view this estimate as low. Other sources (including informed observers working on drug abuse in NGOs in Iran) would add perhaps 500,000-600,000 "casual" (i.e., non-dependent) users, for a total of perhaps two million Iranians who abuse drugs. UNODC estimates that 2.8 percent of the Iranian population over age 15 used opiates in 2001. This figure is more than five times the estimate (0.5 percent) for the U.S. Only Laos and Russia come close to Iran's estimated drug abuse, with 2 percent of Laos's over-15 population estimated to have used opiates in the last year, and 1.8 percent of Russia's. The GOI seems particularly concerned over the sharp increase in intravenous drug abuse. Revised figures show that in 2002, the number of deaths from drug abuse increased by 370 percent to 2989 individuals from just 632 deaths in 2000, reflecting a shift in Iran to abuse of heroin, especially intravenous abuse. Inmates in prison and the homeless are the most likely to take drugs by intravenous injection and to contract HIV through sharing needles. Sixty-seven percent of all recorded HIV cases are associated with drug abuse.

Iran has been in the forefront of efforts by the international community to combat the Afghan drug trade. Three thousand two hundred Iranian law enforcement personnel have died in clashes with heavily armed drug traffickers over the last two decades. Iran spends a significant amount on drug-related expenses, with estimates ranging from \$250-\$300 million to as much as \$800 million each year, depending on whether treatment and other social costs are included. Opiate drug seizures during 2002 in Iran, the last year for which complete-year statistics are available, were almost 208 metric tons of opium equivalent (Opium Equivalent = Opium +(heroin x 10)+(morphine base x 10), making Iran number one in the world in opiate seizures. Projected drug seizures for 2003, based on nine month figures, were even higher, at 243.6 metric tons of opium equivalent. Drug trafficking from Afghanistan under the Taliban became a serious security concern in Iran, with significant killing, kidnapping, and intimidation of villagers along Iran's border with Afghanistan. Traffickers from Afghanistan continue to cause major disruption along Iran's eastern border, but Iranian security forces seem to be having increased success by concentrating their interdiction efforts in the eastern provinces.

Iran has ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but its laws do not bring it completely into compliance with the Convention. The UNODC is working with Iran to modify its laws, train the judiciary, and improve the court system.

II. Status of Country

Land routes across Iran constitute the single most important conduit for Southwest Asian opiates en route to European markets. Entering from Afghanistan and Pakistan into eastern Iran, heroin, opium, and morphine are smuggled overland, usually to Turkey. Another route to Europe and Turkey passes by way of Turkmenistan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Drugs are also smuggled by sea across the Persian Gulf.

Iranians have clearly been using more heroin during the past several years. Heroin has not replaced opium, the traditional drug of choice in Iran, but lower street prices for heroin, and temporary shortages of opium, after the Taliban successfully prohibited opium production in Afghanistan for one year (2000/01), plus higher prices for opium, have encouraged some addicts to switch from opium to heroin. Some heroin is smoked or sniffed, but a growing share is injected.

Iranian seizures in the first nine months of 2003 display some surprising trends. In contrast to recent years, the quantity of heroin seized in Iran, expressed as a share of all opiates seized (i.e., heroin, morphine and opium), has fallen sharply from 19 percent of all opiates seized in 2002 to just 10.4 percent in the nine month statistics available for 2003. The absolute quantity of opium seized is also down even more sharply, by about 70 percent. It is hard to account for this shift analytically, as expectations were for a continuing increase in heroin seizures, as heroin consumption in Iran continues to grow. The share of heroin in all opiates seized in Iran had been rising since 1996 (3.1 percent), but it seems to have peaked in 2001 and 2002 at about 19 percent, then declined this year by almost half.

Interestingly, as the quantity of heroin seized in Iran fell sharply (-64 percent) in 2003, the quantity of morphine base seized increased sharply (+47 percent). Morphine base is destined for shipment across Iran, ultimately to Turkey, where the refining process into heroin is completed. One might speculate that the sharp increase in morphine base seizures in Iran may forecast increased heroin availability at higher purity and lower prices in Western Europe during 2004. But it is risky business to draw conclusions about illicit drug availability from seizure statistics alone. Perhaps Iranian security forces are stationed along Iran's borders in such a way that their share of morphine seized has risen sharply relative to heroin.

While the Central Asian trafficking routes are growing in importance, carrying up to one-third of the total volume of Afghan opiates, the several trans-Iranian trafficking routes continue to carry the lion's share. While a number of factors contribute to the emergence of Central Asia as an important trafficking route for opiates from Afghanistan, it is not unreasonable to speculate that avoiding Iran's tough enforcement effort along its eastern border is part of the story. That said, 17 percent more opiate seizures in Iran during the first nine months of 2003 indicate that trafficking in opiates continues to grow from depressed levels following the Taliban poppy cultivation ban in 2000. There are simply enough opiates flowing out of Afghanistan now to keep all trafficking routes active, traditional and emerging alike.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. Iran is spending roughly 50 percent of its budgeted counter drug expenditures on demand reduction activities, a significant shift from recent expenditure patterns where most funds went for enforcement-related supply reduction. The shift seems to be a clear response to the growing social and health impact of more dangerous drug abuse (e.g., heroin vice opium) and the trend towards more intravenous heroin abuse, with certain addict populations sharing needles.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The Drug Control Headquarters coordinates the drug-related activities of the police, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Ministries of Intelligence and Security, Health, and Islamic Guidance and Education.

Iran pursues an aggressive border interdiction effort. A senior Iranian official told the UNODC that Iran had invested as much as \$800 million in a system of berms, moats, concrete dams, sentry points, and observation towers, as well as a road along its entire eastern border with Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to an official GOI Internet site, Iran has installed 212 border posts, 205 observation posts, 22 concrete barriers, 290 km of canals (depth-4m, width-5m), 659 km of soil embankments, a 78 km barbed wire fence, and 2,645 km of asphalt and gravel roads. It also has relocated numerous border villages to newly constructed sites, so that their inhabitants are less subject to harassment by narcotics traffickers.

Thirty thousand law enforcement personnel are regularly deployed along the border, and Iran reports that more than 3,200 law enforcement officials have been killed in clashes with heavily-armed smugglers during the last two decades. Interdiction efforts by the police and the Revolutionary Guards have resulted in numerous drug seizures. Iranian officials seized 208 metric tons (corrected figures from last year's report) of opiates (opium equivalent) in 2002, and 165 metric tons of opiates (opium equivalent) in the first nine months of 2003. During the same nine-month period of 2002, 150 metric tons of opiates (opium equivalent) were seized. Thus, opiate seizures rose by about 10 percent in the first 9 months of 2003 in comparison with the same period of 2002. The rise in opiate seizures in 2003 suggests a continuing return to larger shipments of opiates from Afghanistan. These increases are likely to continue as one of Afghanistan's largest opium harvests ever moves towards markets in Iran itself, and in the West.

Drug offenses are under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Courts. Punishment for narcotics offenses is severe, with death sentences possible for possession of more than 30 grams of heroin or five kilograms of opium. Those convicted of lesser offenses may be punished with imprisonment, fines, or lashings, although it is believed that lashings have been used less frequently in recent years. Offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 are afforded some leniency. More than 60 percent of the inmates in Iranian prisons are incarcerated for drug offenses, ranging from use to trafficking. Narcotics-related arrests in Iran during 2002 remained high at 118,819 persons, but are down sharply from a peak reached in 2001. Iran has executed more than 10,000 narcotics traffickers in the last decade; executions continue, but the UNODC reports that many in the Iranian judiciary are questioning the deterrent effect of executions.

Corruption. Although there is no indication that senior government officials aid or abet narcotics traffickers, there are periodic reports of corruption among lower-level law enforcement, which is consistent with the transit of multiple-ton drug shipments across Iran. Punishment of corruption appears to be harsh, and the evidence of Iran's commitment to keep drugs from its people is compelling. Iran points to its drug interdiction efforts as benefiting countries in Western Europe and beyond. In fact, given the large quantity of drugs seized in Iran, and the expenditure in life and treasure necessary to make those seizures, this claim would seem to have considerable validity.

Agreements and Treaties. Iran is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Its legislation does not bring it completely into compliance with the Convention, particularly in the areas of money laundering and controlled deliveries. The bill governing money laundering countermeasures, which was submitted to the Iranian Parliament (Majlis) in October 2002 by the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, passed the Majlis and has become law. The bill provides for confiscation of property of those involved with money laundering. A special council of applicable ministers and the Governor of the Central Bank has also been formed to consider necessary powers for the Government to fight other economic crimes. The UNODC is working with Iran through the NOROUZ Program to modify its laws, train the judiciary, and improve the court system.

Iran is also a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substance, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and it signed and ratified the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention in 2001. Iran has shown an increasing desire to cooperate with the international

community on counternarcotics matters. Iran is a member of the ten-nation Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which established a counternarcotics center as part of its secretariat. Iran signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime on December 12, 2000, but has not yet ratified it.

Cultivation/Production. A 1998 U.S. survey of opium poppy cultivation in Iran and a detailed multi-agency assessment concluded that the amount of poppy being grown in Iran was negligible. The survey studied more than 1.25 million acres in Iran's traditional poppy-growing areas, and found no poppy crops growing there, although the survey could not rule out the possibility of some cultivation in remote areas. A follow-up survey in 1999 reached the same conclusion. The UNODC office located in Tehran has repeatedly assured the international community since then that poppies are not cultivated in Iran.

Iran is generally viewed as a transit country for drugs produced elsewhere, but there are some reports of opium refining near the Turkish/Iranian border. Most refining of the opiates moving through Iran is done elsewhere, either in Afghanistan or in Turkey.

Drug Flow/Transit. Shipments of opiates enter Iran overland from Pakistan and Afghanistan by camel, donkey, or truck caravans, often organized and protected by heavily armed ethnic Baluch tribesmen from either side of the frontier. Once inside Iran, large shipments are either concealed within ordinary commercial truck cargoes or broken down into smaller sub-shipments. Foreign embassy observers report that Iranian interdiction efforts have disrupted smuggling convoys sufficiently to force smugglers to change tactics and emphasize concealment. The use of human "mules" is on the rise. Individuals and small groups also attempt to cross the border with two to ten kilograms of drugs, in many cases ingested for concealment. Trafficking through Iran's airports also appears to be on the rise.

Most of the opiates smuggled into Iran from Afghanistan are smuggled to neighboring countries for further processing and transportation to Europe. Turkey is the main processing destination for these opiates, most of which are bound for consumption in Russia and Europe. Essentially all of the morphine base, which shot up to 57.6 percent of opiates seized thus far this year in Iran, is likely moving towards Turkey, as is some share of the much diminished 10 percent or so of opiates moving as heroin. Significant quantities of opium are consumed in Iran itself, but some share also moves on to the west to be refined and consumed as heroin in Europe and elsewhere. There is a northern smuggling route through Iran's Khorasan Province, to Turkmenistan, to Tehran, and then on to Turkey. The mountainous, desert, sparsely settled characteristics of this route makes it hard to police. Traffickers are frequently well armed and dangerous.

The southern route also passes through sparsely settled desert terrain on its way to Tehran en route to Turkey; some opiates moving along the southern route detour to Bandar Abbas and move by sea to the Persian Gulf states. Bandar Abbas also appears to be an entry point for precursor chemicals moving to refineries in Afghanistan. Iran does not specifically control precursor chemicals used for producing illicit drugs, but has made a number of important seizures, mostly at Bandar, of acetic anhydride, used in the refining of heroin. All precursor chemicals seized were consigned to Afghanistan. Trafficking through Iran is facilitated by wide spread smuggling to provide necessities, and to escape high taxation. There are reports that enforcement authorities accept bribes to pass shipments, and not to enforce laws against street sales inside of Iran.

Azerbaijan and Armenia provide alternative routes to Russia and Europe that bypass Turkish interdiction efforts. Additionally, despite the risk of severe punishment, marine transport is used through the Persian Gulf to the nations of the Arabian Peninsula, taking advantage of modern transportation and communication facilities and a laissez-faire commercial attitude in that area. Hashish moves extensively along this route. Oman and Dubai appear to be important destinations, but some Iranian hashish even finds its way to Iraq. Iranian enforcement officials have estimated that as

much as 50 percent of the opium produced in Afghanistan in past years entered Iran, with as much as 700-800 metric tons of opium consumed in Iran itself by its 1.8 to 2 million users.

Hashish seizures in Iran in the first nine months of 2003 were on track to maintain the high level they reached in 2002. At slightly more than 51 metric tons in the first nine months of 2003, only raw, unrefined opium seizures at 60 metric tons exceed them in volume.

The amount of drugs moving to all destinations by mail and courier service in 2002 declined, with seizures of 32.5 kilograms of drugs in 75 cases. The share of total drugs moving in this channel remains miniscule, and seizures of some of these shipments before they leave Iran provide the only evidence of this smuggling method.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). Most observers place the number of drug users in Iran at about 2 million individuals, the great majority males. Smoked opium is the traditional drug of abuse in Iran, but opium is also drunk, dissolved in tea. Opium and its residue are also injected, dissolved in water, by a small number of addicts. Heroin is sniffed, smoked, and injected. Ninety-three percent of opiate addicts are male, with a mean age of 33.6 years (plus or minus 10.5 years), and 1.4 percent (about 21,000) are HIV positive. In the past, the Islamic Republic attacked illegal alcohol use with more fervor than drug abuse, and was reluctant to discuss drug problems openly. Since 1995, public awareness campaigns and attention by two successive Iranian presidents as well as cabinet ministers and the Parliament have given demand reduction a significant boost. Under the UNODC's NOROUZ narcotics assistance project, the GOI spent more than \$68 million dollars in the first year for demand reduction and community awareness. The Prevention Department of Iran's Social Welfare Association runs 12 treatment and rehabilitation centers, as well as 39 out-patient treatment programs in all major cities. Eighty-eight out-patient treatment centers are now operational. Some 30,000 people are treated per year, and some programs have three-month waiting lists. Narcotics Anonymous and other self-help programs can be found in almost all districts as well, and several NGOs focus on drug demand reduction. There are no methadone treatment or HIV prevention programs, although HIV infection in the prison population is a serious concern.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. In the absence of direct diplomatic relations with Iran, the United States has no narcotics initiatives in Iran. The U.S. government continues to encourage regional cooperation against narcotics trafficking. Iran and the United States have expressed similar viewpoints on illicit drugs and the regional impact of the Afghan drug trade. In the context of multilateral settings such as the UN's Six Plus Two group, the United States and Iran have worked together productively. Iran nominated the United States to be coordinator of the Six Plus Two counternarcotics initiative.

The Road Ahead. The GOI has demonstrated sustained national political will and taken strong measures against illicit narcotics, including cooperation with the international community. Iran's actions support the global effort against international drug trafficking. Iran stands to be one of the major benefactors of any long-term reduction in drug production/trafficking from Afghanistan, as it is one of the biggest victims of the short term increase in opium/heroin production there now. The United States anticipates that Iran will continue to pursue policies and actions in support of efforts to combat drug production and trafficking.

Israel

I. Summary

Israel is not a significant producer or transit point for trafficking in drugs. The Israeli National Police (INP), however, report that during the year 2003 the Israeli drug market continued to be characterized by high demand in nearly all sectors of society and a high availability of drugs including cannabis, ecstasy (MDMA), cocaine, heroin and LSD. In particular, the INP reports a high demand for cocaine and an increase in seizures abroad of cocaine bound for Israel. The INP also reports a continuing high demand for ecstasy in 2003, but a low level of seizure, especially compared with 2002, which was a record year. There was a sharp increase in the amount of marijuana seized along the southern border with Egypt due to the employment of border police there. Furthermore, this year a high demand for hashish was reported with an increase in the amount of hashish seized along the border with Lebanon. Lebanon is traditionally a major source country for hashish bound for Israel. The INP reports that the amount of heroin seized remains relatively low as in previous years, and the level of demand is unchanged. The quantity of LSD seized in 2003 far exceeds the norm, thanks to a single record seizure of 25,000 blotters. The number of drug arrests remained steady compared to last year, with 3,616 in 2003 and 3,662 in 2002. (Note: All data is for the period January through October) Widespread use of ecstasy by Israeli youths is a continuing source of concern to authorities. Israel's domestic law contains the legislative requirements mandated by the convention. Israel is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Israel is not a major producer of narcotics or precursor chemicals. Israeli narcotics traffickers operating outside of Israel continue to be deeply involved in the international ecstasy trade. The INP reports that during the year 2003 the Israeli drug market continued to be characterized by a high demand in nearly all sectors of society and a high availability of drugs including cannabis, ecstasy, cocaine, heroin and LSD. The INP estimates the annual scope of the Israeli market to be 100 tons of marijuana, 20 tons of hashish, 20 million tablets of ecstasy, 4 tons of heroin, 3 tons of cocaine, and hundreds of thousands of LSD blotters. Officials are also concerned with the widespread use of ecstasy among Israeli youth.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. In 2003, the INP continued its general policy of interdiction at Israel's borders and points of entry. This year, in recognition of the importance of their work, the INP upgraded the status and facilities available to the South Central Border Unit, which patrols the border with Egypt between the Gaza Strip and Eilat. This unit is responsible for an increase in seizures along the Egyptian border. As Israel is a multicultural society, the Israeli Anti-Drug Authority's (IADA) master plan is tailored specifically to the cultural needs of the various communities found there. For example, it is developing treatment and prevention programs focused on the Israeli-Arab sector. It is also working to change the public atmosphere regarding drug use, placing special emphasis on parents.

Law Enforcement Efforts. INP reports a high demand for cocaine in Israel and notes an increase in seizures abroad of cocaine bound for Israel. INP reports that in 2003, 66 kilograms (kg.) of cocaine was seized, a figure down from last year's number, which included a single seizure of 23 kilograms. of cocaine along the Jordanian border in September of 2002. In 2003, 14,795 kilograms. of marijuana was seized, representing an increase over 2002. Again, this increase is attributed to the stepped-up presence of the South Central Border Unit along the Egyptian border. In 2003, 900 kilograms. of

hashish was seized, a quantity down significantly from last year, but consistent with a slow long-term rise in use of hashish in Israel. (In 2002, in a single operation two metric tons of hashish were seized on the Red Sea by Israeli authorities. This abnormally large seizure created a “base effect” when compared to this year's more normal seizures of ca. 1 metric ton of hashish) The number of ecstasy tablets seized in 2003 was 97,658, down from the record number of 930,000 in 2002, which included a single seizure netting 800,000 tablets. The amount of heroin seized in 2003 was 51 kilograms., including a big seizure of 34 kilograms. of heroin smuggled into Israel from Jordan. Overall, the quantity of heroin seized is comparable to last year. In 2003, 25,000 LSD blotters were seized in a single operation, bringing the total number of blotters seized to 28,331. In comparison, 2,484 blotters were reported seized during the same period of 2002. The number of drug arrests tracked last year's numbers, with 3,616 in 2003 and 3,662 in 2002. This represents a decrease of 1.3 percent.

The Department of Customs and VAT, National Drug Unit, reports that from February through September 2003 it made 110 seizures at ports of entry, including airports and maritime ports. These seizures include 15.35 kilograms. of cannabis, 58 milligrams of morphine, 11.2 kilograms. cocaine, 9 grams of heroin, and 15,020 ecstasy tablets.

Corruption. As a matter of government policy and practice, the Government of Israel (GOI) does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. In 2003 Israel had no cases of narcotics-related corruption, nor is there any explicit or implicit official support for narcotics-related activities.

Agreements and Treaties. In June 2002, Israel became a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention after passing all the necessary laws to make Israeli laws consistent with the Convention. Israel is also a party to the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and the 1972 Protocol amending the 1971 Convention. A customs mutual assistance agreement and a mutual legal assistance treaty are also in force between Israel and the U.S. Israel is one of 36 parties to the European Treaty on Extradition and has separate extradition treaties with several other countries, including the U.S. Under the Israeli extradition law all persons, whether citizens or not, may be extradited for purposes of standing trial for extraditable offenses. If the requested person was both a citizen and resident of Israel at the time the offense was committed, he may be extradited to stand trial abroad only if the state seeking extradition promises in advance to allow the person to return to Israel to serve any sentence imposed. Four individuals were extradited from Israel to the U.S. for drug-related charges in 2003.

Cultivation/Production. There is negligible cultivation and production of illicit drugs in Israel.

Drug Flow/Transit. Israel is not a significant transit country, although Israeli citizens have been part of international drug trafficking networks in source, transit, and distribution countries. INP, IADA, and Israeli customs officials are particularly concerned about drug smuggling into Israel from neighboring countries (Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt). The INP reports that the war in Iraq and an increased police presence along Israel's borders in 2003 had a major impact on the drug market and caused temporary shortages of a few types of drugs, especially those that are smuggled via the land borders. The war in Iraq caused a delay of drug smuggling operations via the Israeli border with Jordan and Egypt because the traffickers from both sides were wary of changes in Israeli army deployments in those areas. Trafficking of hashish across the Israeli-Lebanese border decreased because of the murder of a senior Lebanese drug trafficker in late 2002 and because of successful law enforcement operations in which several trafficking networks were shut down. The Israeli police report that one such operation uncovered a connection between the Israeli-Arab trafficking network and Hizbullah activists. Jordan continued to be a drug transit country to Israel for heroin, hashish, and cocaine. In September 2003, the Israeli police seized 34 kilograms. of heroin and 23 kilograms. of cocaine smuggled into Israel from Jordan. This year, the South Central Border Unit of the Border Police began patrolling the border with Egypt between the Gaza Strip and Eilat. Since this unit was

formed, it has seized ten tons of marijuana (160 percent more than in 2002), 14 tons of untaxed tobacco, 6 kilograms of hashish and 750 grams of heroin. The Unit arrested 88 people, primarily Egyptians and Israelis, most of whom were believed to be involved in the prostitution trade.

Demand Reduction. A number of both public and private entities are working to reduce the demand for drugs through awareness and prevention. The Israeli Anti-Drug Authority (IADA) is one of the main governmental actors in this effort. Its mission, among other things, is to spearhead prevention efforts, initiate and develop educational services and public awareness, and treat and rehabilitate drug users. It coordinates with and directs the activities of a number of government ministries with a role in reducing demand. The IADA also seeks to change the public atmosphere to counter increasing social acceptance of recreational drug use. Prevention programs target high-risk segments of the population like youth, students, backpackers, new immigrants, and others. For example, in 2003 the IADA implemented a pilot program for kindergarten children ages 5-6 in the city of Ashkelon. The IADA also offers workshops and lectures for immigrants from Russia and Ethiopia in their respective languages and tailored to their particular cultural needs. The IADA is working to reduce demand for narcotics among soldiers by providing officers with training to identify and to combat effectively the use of drugs within their units. There is currently also an ongoing public awareness campaign aimed at parents and designed to focus their attention on their children's whereabouts and activities. A workplace drug prevention program, modeled after similar programs in the U.S., is planned for implementation in 2004. In 2003, IADA opened a drug hotline, a comprehensive source of information regarding all facets of drug use, treatment and prevention. The IADA is currently concentrating on human resources development, including the development of a professional infrastructure. It is establishing a unified standard for training purposes, including development of a curriculum for nurses, police, prison employees, physicians, and counselors, as well as other drug prevention, treatment, and enforcement professionals. The IADA also performs basic, epidemiological, and evaluative research in the narcotic drug field.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The Road Ahead. The DEA looks forward to continued cooperation and coordination with its counterparts in the Israeli law enforcement community. The GOI is seeking to widen and build on relations with other countries and has created an office of International Relations within the IADA to pursue this objective. In 2003, Israel was made a member of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) under the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Israel begins its four-year-term as a member of the CND in January 2004.

Kenya

I. Summary

Kenya is a transit country for heroin and hashish, mostly bound from South Asia for Europe and North America. Heroin transiting Kenya has markedly increased in quality in recent years and is destined increasingly for North America. Nigerian drug cartels appear to be looking to Kenya as an increasingly attractive alternative route for narcotics smuggling. Although the exact impact of this heroin on the U.S. market is unclear, it is not believed to be significant. Cannabis/marijuana is grown domestically in Kenya, and also imported from neighboring countries for the illegal domestic market. There is a small, and apparently dwindling local heroin market. Air passenger profiling, airport controls, and other techniques have helped reduce airborne heroin shipments. Interdiction of narcotics shipments by sea has been unsuccessful as Kenyan police lack the necessary infrastructure, funding, or staffing for such an endeavor. A program for profiling shipping containers is in effect, but has had little success.

The two year-old national drug control master plan has not moved forward since the cabinet turned the project over to an inter-agency committee led by the Solicitor General. The Anti-Narcotics Unit (ANU) of the Kenyan police continues to cooperate well with international and regional counternarcotics officials. The GOK also cooperated closely with the DEA and other U.S. law enforcement agencies to successfully conclude a major extradition case in February 2003. Although government officials profess strong support for counternarcotics efforts, the overall program suffers from a lack of resources, and financial deficits hinder its intelligence collection capabilities. Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has enacted full implementing legislation.

II. Status of Country

Kenya is an important transit country and a minor producer of narcotics. Heroin and hashish transit Kenya on their way to markets in South Africa, Europe, and, increasingly, the U.S. The share moving to the U.S. has a relatively small impact on the United States, and quantities are down from their 2001 peak. Cannabis or marijuana is produced in commercial quantities for the domestic market. Kenya remains a transit country for small quantities of cocaine and other drugs (Mandrax, other synthetics) destined for South African and Western European consumers. All these drugs originate outside Africa. Kenya's sea and air transportation infrastructure, and the network of commercial and family ties that link some Kenyans to South Asia, make Kenya a significant transit country for Afghan heroin.

In 2000, officials noted a dramatic shift from low-purity brown heroin to higher-purity white heroin, and believe that the higher-purity product is destined principally for the United States. This trend continued in 2003. Officials now believe that the United States is at least as significant as Europe as a destination for heroin transiting Kenya. It is difficult to quantify the amount of heroin reaching the United States through Kenya and other points in East Africa. In recent years, Kenya has been an important transit point for South Asian cannabis resin (hashish), and police made several multi-ton hashish seizures. However, hashish seizures have fallen off dramatically since 2000. Cocaine seizures are also down sharply in the past two years.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. The 2001 "National Drug Control Master Plan" continues to languish within an inter-agency committee chaired by the nation's Solicitor General. Counter-narcotics agencies, notably the ANU, continue to depend on the 1994 Narcotics Act for enforcement authorities and interdiction

guidelines. Most believe that the ten year-old Act is sufficient to sustain current interdiction efforts, but note the Act's lack of provisions addressing money laundering.

The National Drug Control Master Plan, should it be implemented, would provide for a senior civil servant-donor liaison, who would coordinate a broad counternarcotics effort to include a much-expanded public campaign aimed at preventing drug abuse. Additionally, the plan summarizes policies, defines priorities and apportions responsibilities for drug control to various agencies.

ANU officers have continued a program of outreach to judges and magistrates, conducting seminars on counternarcotics law and the seriousness of narcotics issues. The ANU continued to publicize its counternarcotics message effectively through local media and increased public awareness through lectures aimed at a range of students from primary grade schools through universities and members of local civic groups.

Accomplishments. The ANU began a program of judicial outreach in 2002, and that program has helped lead to good results in sentencing. The ANU also believes the court system has been more responsive since the dismissal in March of one of Kenya's more problematic Law Court judges on corruption charges. Other notable arrests include that of a Kenya Airways purser carrying 5 kilograms of heroin in June. A security officer for the airline was also arrested in the sting, and was sentenced to the maximum jail time in accordance with Kenyan law.

In October, the ANU provided Embassy Nairobi with information on a suspected heroin courier that resulted in her interception and arrest at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. Many ANU officers have undergone training, much of it through the or bilateral programs sponsored by the U.S., German, British, Japanese and other governments. The ANU and the Kenyan Customs Service now have a cadre of officers proficient in profiling and searching suspected drug couriers and containers at airports and seaports. Profiling has yielded good results, albeit generally for couriers and not major traffickers, and the success rate over the past two years has forced traffickers to seek viable land routes through Kenya rather than a sole dependence on Jomo Kenyata International Airport.

Seaport profiling has proved difficult. The ANU has trained two officers in maritime narcotics interdiction, but does not possess any boats with which to conduct search operations. The ANU has built its surveillance capabilities and has capitalized on the information yielded from increasingly sophisticated operations. Inadequate resources, a problem throughout the Kenyan police force, significantly reduce the ANU's operational effectiveness.

The ANU cooperates fully with the United States and other nations on counternarcotics investigations and other operations.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Kenya seized 17.6 kilograms of heroin in 2003, a approximately a 46 percent decrease from the quantities seized in 2002 and arrested 34 people on heroin-related charges. (All statistics on drug seizures in this section reflect the period from January to August 2003, the most recent tabulation done by the ANU.) Officials report a sharp shift to higher-quality white heroin from lower-quality brown heroin, and report that traffickers have re-oriented much of the white heroin transiting Kenya for the United States in hopes of a larger profit yield. Most couriers arrested in Kenya conceal heroin by swallowing, though some also hide it in their shoes, false-bottom briefcases, and car engine parts. The ANU concentrates its antiheroin operations at Kenya's two main international airports. Officials believe Kenyan coastal waters and ports are major transit points for the shipment of hashish from Pakistan to Europe and North America.

While 2003 saw an increase in the number of persons arrested on charges of cocaine smuggling, seizures yielded 3.39 kilograms, down significantly from the previous year (17.6 kilograms). Cocaine seized in Kenya is believed to originate from Brazil and Columbia; its abuse and local availability is not widespread.

Authorities believe a sustained drop in the size of cannabis seizures over the past three years demonstrates a decrease in crop production following two successful, highly-publicized, targeted raids of 14 farms along Mt. Kenya in 2001 and 2002 that collectively destroyed 404,978 kilograms of cannabis. This year, 1,802 persons were arrested in raids that confiscated 2,270.5 kilograms of cannabis.

The ANU continued to operate roadblocks for domestic drug trafficking interdiction and is pursuing a variety of policy initiatives for more effective coordination with other government agencies. The ANU has launched an outreach effort to persuade judges and magistrates of the seriousness of counternarcotics offenses and identify ways cases can be handled more effectively. The ANU also disseminates its messages through local media.

Corruption. Corruption remains a significant barrier to effective narcotics enforcement at both the prosecutorial and law enforcement level. ANU estimates that a majority of the 200 officers who left the service over the past five years were dismissed as a result of being “compromised.”

Police frequently complain that the courts are ineffective in handling counternarcotics cases, likely through a combination of corruption, misunderstanding of the law, and simple judicial backlog. In the past, payments ranging from \$255 to \$6,360 were offered as bribes to judges presiding over narcotics cases. These figures for proffered bribes are based on known cases; other bribes offered remain unknown. By March of this year, 10 judges had been dismissed on corruption-related charges, and in September, a parliamentary committee focused on the judiciary found there to be substantial and credible evidence linking 152 of Kenya's 300 judges and magistrates to corruption and unethical conduct. The Kenyan High Court had previously reassigned all narcotics cases destined for the docket of one of these judges after repeated official protests by ANU officials alleging bribery and flagrant disregard for penal procedures laid out under the 1994 Narcotics Act.

The National Alliance Rainbow Coalition was successfully elected in December 2002 on a campaign platform that included a pledge to root out official corruption. Members of the law enforcement community have cited significant improvement within the court system since the new government's election. Despite Kenya's strict narcotics laws, however, which encompass most forms of narcotics-related corruption, there are continued but unconfirmed reports of public officials being involved in narcotics trafficking, and 2003 saw incidents of airport and airline personnel in collusion with traffickers, and in one instance outright involvement.

Agreements and Treaties. Kenya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Kenya is also a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention and its 1972 Protocol and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty remains in force between the United States and Kenya through a 1965 exchange of notes.

Under a 1991 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), amended in 1996, the U.S. donated surveillance and computer equipment to the ANU in 1997. The MOU also provides for sharing of narcotics-related information. The United States and Kenya signed another MOU in 2002 to cover the donation of equipment and training to the ANU.

Cultivation and Production. A significant number of Kenyan farmers illegally grow cannabis or marijuana on a commercial basis for the domestic market. Fairly large-scale cannabis cultivation occurs in the Lake Victoria basin, in the central highlands around Mt. Kenya and along the coast. Foreign tourists export small amounts of Kenyan marijuana. Officials continue to conduct aerial surveys to identify significant cannabis-producing areas in cooperation with the Kenya Wildlife Service. Aerial surveys this year yielded no discovery of large-scale cultivation sites as they had in previous years.

Drug Flow/Transit. Kenya is strategically located along a major transit route between Southwest Asian producers of heroin and markets in Europe and North America. Heroin normally transits Kenya

by air, carried by individual couriers. As a result of counterprofiling measures and enhanced counternarcotics efforts, ANU officials believe traffickers are finding Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) to be an increasingly inconvenient exit point for drugs. The ANU reports a new trend of Western and Eastern European couriers trafficking in heroin transiting Kenya to Europe and North America, and notes that for the first time, it did not arrest any West African couriers in 2003. Once in Kenya, heroin is typically delivered to agents of West African crime syndicates.

Postal and commercial courier services are also used for narcotics shipments through Kenya. In the past, Kenya has been a transit country for mandrax en route from India to South Africa. For the four years proceeding 2003, there had been no mandrax seizures in Kenya; however, in 2003, one person was arrested transporting 10,000 mandrax tablets.

Domestic Programs. Kenya has made some progress in efforts to institute programs for demand reduction. Illegal cannabis and khat are the domestic drugs of choice. (Note: Fresh khat leaves, when chewed, produce an amphetamine-like effect.) Two active ingredients of qat, cathinone and cathine, were recently classified on Kenya's Schedule I and Schedule IV, respectively, under the standards of the same standards as the U.S. Controlled Substance Act. Heroin abuse is limited generally to members of the economic elite and a slightly broader range of users on the coast. Solvent abuse is widespread (and highly visible) among street children in Nairobi and other urban centers. There are no reliable statistics on domestic consumption of illicit narcotics.

Demand reduction efforts have largely been limited to publicity campaigns sponsored by private donors and a UNDCP project to bring counternarcotics education into the schools. In 2001, however, the Government of Kenya appointed a National Coordinator on Campaign Against Drug Abuse to initiate national public education programs on drugs. This program continues under his guidance to the present and is making reasonable progress. There are no special government rehabilitation or drug abuse treatment facilities, but some churches and non-governmental organizations provide limited rehabilitation and treatment programs for solvent-addicted street children.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The principal U.S. counternarcotics objective in Kenya is to interdict the flow of narcotics to the United States. We seek to accomplish this objective through law enforcement cooperation, the encouragement of a strong Kenyan government commitment to narcotics interdiction, and strengthening Kenyan counternarcotics capabilities.

Bilateral Cooperation. In 2003, the U.S. provided the ANU with computers and related equipment and has facilitated several DEA courses. The United States remains active in the Mini-Dublin Group, which has responsibility for coordinating counternarcotics assistance from several Western donors. The United States is in the process of seeking an amendment to the MOU it signed with the Government of Kenya in 2000 to provide increased law enforcement assistance to the GOK. Once signed, this amendment will allow the U.S. to set up an automated fingerprint identification system for Kenyan law enforcement that will not only assist the ANU to identify suspected traffickers but also assist Kenya's other law enforcement entities with tracking terrorists and criminals applying for entry and within the country. Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection (CPB) conducted an assessment trip to Kenya in March 2003. As a result of the port security issues, CPB submitted a proposal for a multi-faceted narcotics interdiction strategy.

The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to take advantage of its good relations with Kenyan law enforcement to build professionalism, operational capacity and information sharing. As a regional hub, Nairobi remains a key location for conducting regional training and other regional initiatives and the USG will actively seek ways to maximize counternarcotics efforts both in Kenya and throughout East Africa. Perhaps most significantly, the USG will work with local, regional and international partners

to better understand and combat the flow of international narcotics, particularly heroin, through Kenya to the United States.

Lebanon

I. Summary

Lebanon is not a major illicit drug producing or drug- transit country. The Lebanese government continued its zero-tolerance policy for poppy cultivation and opium/heroin production this year. It took serious actions to prevent cannabis cultivation and to eradicate illicit crops before harvest in the Biqā' Valley in 2003. It appears that this will continue to be a routine operation every year. However, illicit crop cultivation is likely to resume, albeit at reduced levels, in 2004 due to a lack of suitable alternative crops to sustain the livelihoods of local farmers at a time of growing economic uncertainty.

Cannabis cultivation decreased from 2002 to 2003, and there was a small amount of poppy cultivation in 2003. There is practically no illicit drug refining in Lebanon. Drug trafficking across the Lebanese-Syrian border has diminished substantially as a result of Lebanese and Syrian efforts to deter smuggling activity. Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

The deteriorating economic situation in Lebanon—especially in the agricultural sector—led to a resurgence of cannabis cultivation by farmers in the Biqā' Valley in 2002 and to a lesser extent in 2003. There were also minor instances of poppy cultivation. The GOL made serious efforts to deter new cultivation in 2003 and to eradicate the resulting crop before the summer harvest. The government also continued a counternarcotics campaign to discourage new planting. According to the Internal Security Forces (ISF), approximately 39,952,000 square meters of poppy (Ca. 4000 hectares) and 7,293,850 square meters of cannabis were eradicated in 2003. The Judiciary Police—the law enforcement agency tasked with counternarcotics responsibilities—claimed to perform complete eradication in 2003.

At least five types of drugs are available in Lebanon: hashish, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and other synthetics, such as MDMA (Ecstasy). Although cannabis and heroin are no longer widely available in large quantities, small quantities continue to be available for local consumption. Lebanon is not a major transit country for illicit drugs, and most trafficking is done by “amateurs,” rather than major drug networks. Marijuana and opium derivatives are trafficked to a modest extent in the region, but there is no evidence that the illicit narcotics that transit Lebanon reach the U.S. in sufficient amounts to have a significant effect. South American cocaine is smuggled into Lebanon primarily via air and sea routes from Europe, Jordan, and Syria, or directly to Lebanon. Lebanese nationals living in South America in concert with resident Lebanese traffickers often finance these operations. According to a report issued by the Judiciary Police this year, very small quantities of cocaine were smuggled, as compared to a yearly average of approximately 500 kilograms smuggled in previous years. Synthetics are smuggled into Lebanon primarily for sale to high-income recreational users.

There is no significant illicit drug refining in Lebanon; such activity has practically disappeared due to vigilance of the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Small amounts of dual use precursor chemicals, however, are shipped from Lebanon to Turkey via Syria. Legislation passed in 1998 authorized seizure of assets if a drug trafficking nexus is established in court proceedings.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. The Lebanese government took serious actions to prevent illicit cannabis cultivation in 2003. The government also launched a public awareness advertising campaign under the slogan “Together Against Drugs” in 2003 to discourage drug use. The Ministry of Interior sent

counternarcotics messages to mobile phone users. Counternarcotics posters and slogans were displayed throughout the country. Counternarcotics ads and video clips were broadcast on television stations and tee-shirts reading “Together Against Drugs” will be distributed by the Ministry of Interior to NGOs participating in the drug awareness campaigns.

Accomplishments. In 2003, the Government of Lebanon resumed cannabis and poppy eradication. The ISF stated that they eradicated all cultivated crops during the year. However, according to Dr. Riad Saade, a reliable local expert and Director General of the Lebanese Center of Agricultural Studies and Research, farmers reported that there was no cannabis production in 2003 whereas approximately 2,500 hectares of land were used for illicit cannabis production in 2002. Some observers claim that some of the crops eradicated in 2003 were located in previously planted fields which grew back. Given the continuing agricultural crisis in the country, and the limited amount of development funds available, impoverished farmers will likely continue to cultivate illicit cannabis, and there is a danger of a return to illicit opium cultivation, unless serious deterrence measures and/or meaningful development alternatives are made available.

Law Enforcement and Transit Cooperation. Lebanese security services coordinate with their international counterparts. The Judiciary Police report that close governmental cooperation exists with the major transit countries, particularly those in Europe. The Lebanese military also closely coordinates its activities against drug traffickers with its Syrian counterpart.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). There is a growing recognition among Lebanese leaders of the need to address the problem of illicit drug use. In 2002, the government launched a widespread public awareness campaign to discourage drug use which remains on-going. Textbooks approved for use in all public schools contain a chapter on narcotics to increase public awareness. The current law on drugs dictates that a National Council on Drugs (NCD) be established, whose services and activities will include substance use treatment, prevention, awareness, assistance to substance users and their families, in addition to setting up a national action plan.

There are several detoxification programs, but the only entity in Lebanon that offers a comprehensive drug rehabilitation program is Oum al-Nour (ON), a Beirut-based NGO. The GOL, through the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Public Health, provides 36 percent of ON's yearly budget, which is projected at \$1,000,000 for 2004. ON estimates that the age of the average drug addict in Lebanon is getting gradually younger since the end of the country's civil war in 1990, with pre-college and college-age youth now being the most vulnerable. ON statistics cite that the most commonly abused illicit substance is heroin, but use of “designer” drugs such as methamphetamine and Ecstasy is reported as possibly rising.

ON operates three drug treatment centers in Lebanon, two for men and one for women. The centers, which have a maximum capacity of 70 patients, offer a year-long residential program for hard-core addicts, and sometimes operate above capacity. The program provides recovery for the residents' physical, psychiatric, spiritual, and social well-being without the use of substitution products. A new section, funded by USAID, was built in one of the men's centers and can accommodate 12 to 15 patients. It was inaugurated this summer but is not yet operational while staff is being trained. The organization lacks outpatient care for individuals whose addictions do not necessarily warrant hospitalization.

A new walk-in outpatient therapeutic facility for addiction that offers prevention, awareness, and psychological treatment to drug users and their families called Skoun (which means “internal tranquility” or “silence” in Arabic) opened recently in downtown Beirut. The center is currently treating some 10 outpatients. One recurrent problem is the lack of coordination between concerned ministries and sometimes between the various NGOs that work on substance abuse.

According to the report “Substance Use and Misuse in Lebanon”, released by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in May 2003, ISF participants in the study reported that individuals arrested for substance-related offenses most commonly use heroin, hashish/marijuana, and cocaine. Furthermore, the participants noted that medicinal pill usage is on the rise and so is Benzhexol use in prisons. On the other hand, Ecstasy use was perceived as uncommon. As for data from treatment/rehabilitation centers, it showed that Ecstasy and medicinal opiate abuse is on the rise. Data gathered from street substance users showed that codeine and other medications abuse are on the rise, and additionally, the young population is increasingly inhaling paint thinner.

Law Enforcement Efforts. From January to November 2003, the GOL seized 11.1 metric tons of hashish, 2.7 kilograms of opium, 943.25 grams of heroin, 40.333 kilograms of cocaine, 464 grams of marijuana, 805 unspecified drug pills, 254.753 kilograms of cannabis seeds, and 7.2 kilograms of opium seeds. From January to November 2003, 1,212 persons were arrested on charges related to narcotics use or distribution.

Corruption. Corruption remains endemic in Lebanon up to the senior levels of government. While low-level corruption in the counternarcotics forces is possible, there is no evidence of wide-scale corruption within the Judiciary Police or the ISF, which appear to be genuinely dedicated to combating drugs.

Agreements and Treaties. Lebanon is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention, as amended by the 1972 Protocol.

Cultivation and Production. There are conflicting reports of illicit crop cultivation. Statistics from the Judicial Police this year show that 39,952,000 square meters of poppy and 7,293,850 square meters of cannabis were eradicated during 2003. However, according to an agricultural research institute, farmers claim there was no cannabis production in 2003 as compared to a production of 2,500 hectares in 2002.

Drug Flow/Transit. Illicit drug trafficking via traditional smuggling routes has been somewhat curtailed by joint Syrian- Lebanese operations, but nonetheless continues. Drug trafficking along the Israel-Lebanon border has been negligible since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000 and the subsequent near-sealing of the border. The primary route for smuggling cannabis from Lebanon during 2003 was overland to Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and via sea routes to Europe. According to the ISF, large exports of cannabis from Lebanon to Europe are more and more difficult for smugglers due to increased seashore patrols and airport control. The ISF asserts that no cannabis has been smuggled into the United States. The GOL conceded that small quantities of morphine and heroin are smuggled overland from Turkey for local use.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Policy Initiatives. In meetings with Lebanese officials, U.S. officials continue to stress the need for diligence in preventing the production and transportation of narcotics, and the need for a comprehensive development program for the Biqa' Valley that would provide the impoverished residents with alternate sources of income. The USG also stresses the importance of anticorruption efforts. USAID, in close cooperation with the Embassy, continues its four-component program to aid and empower key Lebanese stakeholders, local government, media, and civil society in their efforts to fight corruption. On the supply side, USAID assists U.S. and local NGOs working with villages to promote the substitution of illicit crops with legitimate, economically viable ones. The U.S. State Department funded a narcotics demand reduction program administered by a Beirut-based NGO, the Justice and Mercy Association (AJEM). The project is designed to create a drug treatment facility in

Roumieh prison to provide treatment and social rehabilitation for drug addicted prisoners incarcerated there. A second project aimed at expanding receiving and treatment capacity at Oum el Nour centers was also supported with State funds.

The Road Ahead. Given the level of Syrian involvement in Lebanese domestic affairs, success in combating narcotics cultivation and trafficking depends on the will of both the Syrian and Lebanese governments. The GOL, in cooperation with the Syrian government, appears to have eradicated all illicit cultivation during 2003. However, it has not successfully developed a socio-economic strategy to tackle the problem of crop substitution. The USG will continue to press the GOL to maintain its commitment to combating drug production and transit and implementing anticorruption policies.

Madagascar

I. Summary

Madagascar is not a major producer, supplier or exporter of drugs or precursor chemicals. Cannabis, destined primarily for domestic consumption, is cultivated in small quantities in relatively inaccessible areas in the north, west, and south. There were no seizures of illicit drugs at Madagascar's international airports in 2003. However, in two separate cases, small amounts of heroin were seized in the neighboring islands of Reunion and Mauritius, after having reportedly transited Madagascar. An Inter-ministerial Commission for Coordination of the Fight Against Drugs (the Commission), nominally headed by the Prime Minister, but managed on a day-to-day basis by its Secretary General, oversees Madagascar's counternarcotics efforts. In late 2002, the Commission presented an ambitious three-year counternarcotics strategy. Lack of funding has slowed implementation, but some useful elements, including draft money laundering legislation, are moving forward.

II. Status of Country

Available statistics indicate that production, cultivation and trafficking in illicit drugs in Madagascar are chiefly limited to cannabis. Conditions in remote areas of the western and northern provinces and in the southern provinces favor rapid growth of this crop. Statistics for surface area devoted to cannabis cultivation in Madagascar are not available. Although a small portion of this production may be finding its way to markets in neighboring islands and the African continent, it appears that the vast majority is distributed through informal networks and consumed domestically. Production and sale of cannabis may be a way to supplement income in acutely poor rural areas. The Commission reported that in 2002 (the last year for which complete figures are available) authorities seized 1,744 metric tons of cannabis and arrested 550 people for use, trafficking, or growing of cannabis.

Malagasy Customs reported no seizures of illicit drugs at Madagascar's four international airports during 2003. Antananarivo's Ivato airport, which accounts for well over 95 percent of international traffic, has upgraded security and screening procedures. Search and boarding procedures are less rigorous at the smaller airports of Nosy Be, Tamatave and Mahajanga, which have limited regional international service. Over the past six years, Malagasy authorities have seized a total of 1.3 kilograms of cocaine and 1.4 kilograms of heroin at Antananarivo Ivato Airport, but none of the seizures occurred within the last three years.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. Since 1998 the Commission has led the Government of Madagascar's counternarcotics efforts. Its principal work was the drafting of a three-year national plan, which was presented to the National Assembly in late 2002. The plan provides an overview of narcotics issues in Madagascar and includes proposals for crop eradication, stronger counternarcotics and anti-money laundering legislation, awareness campaigns aimed primarily at children, and rehabilitation programs. The drafting of the plan received funding and technical support from the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention and the United Nations Development Program. However, the GOM has not proactively sought the foreign donor support necessary to implement the plan fully. Few elements of the plan have moved forward, apart from the drafting of money laundering legislation and some small-scale drug abuse awareness campaigns.

Law Enforcement and Accomplishments. Two recent seizures on neighboring Indian Ocean islands have raised the possibility of Madagascar serving as a transit country for regional drug traffic. In

October, police on the French island of Reunion arrested a Mauritian woman in possession of 2 kilograms of heroin and press reports suggested that the drugs may have come through Madagascar. In early December, acting on a tip, a Mauritian counternarcotics unit arrested a Malagasy woman at Port Louis airport. Under observation in a Mauritian hospital, the woman passed thirty small vials containing heroin. In October, Malagasy authorities expelled a Madagascar-born businessman of Pakistani origin, who was suspected of crimes ranging from murder to bribery. The Secretary General of the Commission, Maurice Randrianame, speculated that the man might also have been involved in transshipment of narcotics from Pakistan through Madagascar to Reunion and Mauritius. Randrianame also cited information that larger quantities of heroin from Pakistan might be awaiting shipment through Madagascar. Inadequate law enforcement assets, training and expertise prevent Malagasy authorities from quantifying and dealing with a narcotics problem that may be larger than the statistics indicate.

Treaties and Agreements. Madagascar has ratified the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The Secretary General of the Commission said his agency had prepared an instrument of ratification for the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime to be presented to the National Assembly. He also said Madagascar would sign and quickly ratify the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature in early December 2003. A 1997 Malagasy law deals with domestic narcotics production, use and trafficking and aims to ensure domestic implementation of commitments made in international instruments on narcotics issues.

Corruption. As a matter of government policy and practice, the GOM does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. During 2003 the USG supported several programs with both direct and indirect narcotics trafficking implications in Madagascar. The principal action was the delivery to the Malagasy Navy in February 2003 of seven retired U.S. Coast Guard motor lifeboats, which improved Madagascar's ability to patrol portions of its 5,000 kilometers of coastline.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will work closely with Madagascar to improve the interdiction capacity of law enforcement personnel.

Mali

I. Summary

Drug trafficking and abuse are minimal in Mali. Small quantities of hashish and amphetamines enter Mali from Senegal and small quantities of cannabis are grown in Mali for use in Mali. Mali has seen an increase in hard drugs, originating in Asia, transiting Mali from Mauritania to other African countries. As a result, the Government of Mali (GOM) has reorganized the narcotics division of the Police Directorate to increase its presence at Bamako International Airport. The GOM has also established a regional presence in some cities to address changes in drug entry and distribution. Mali seized and destroyed one ton of hashish during the period from October 2002 to October 2003. Mali did not keep records of previous years seizures; however, GOM officials feel that the problem continues to be small.

II. Status of Country

Mali's per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of \$250 (2002) places it among the world's 10 poorest nations. Mali's vast porous borders and antiquated communications infrastructure would seemingly be attractive to drug traffickers; however, the vastness of the country with few paved roads coupled with the general poverty level have contributed to the fact that Mali has not developed a serious drug abuse or narcotics problem. U.S.-Malian relations are excellent and expanding. They are based on shared goals of averting suffering and strengthening democracy. Mali is not a significant location for drug production, drug transit, or production, trading and transit of precursor chemicals.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. Within its limited resources, Mali is trying to meet the goals of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. There have been no large drug related cases in Mali in 2003.

Accomplishments. Mali law enforcement authorities redirected some resources to counter trafficking at the Bamako airport, the most likely entry point for hard narcotics.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Given limited resources, the Malian government has not made an effort to strengthen the counter narcotics police or the national prosecutor's office with personnel or budgetary increases or new training. In fact, overall manpower for the narcotics police was reduced from 30 people to 17 during 2003 (officers relocated to other higher priority divisions within the police directorate). Bamako International Airport has increased visible security measures, implemented a more reliable access badge system, and received new equipment that will aid in Mali's drug interdiction program. Overall, Mali seized and destroyed one ton of hashish from October 2002 to October 2003. Because of limited funding, Mali does not have enough officers to cover the Bamako train station or regional bus stations. In addition, the Narcotics division of the Police Directorate does not have a patrol car at its disposal to transfer its officers from one location to another.

Corruption. By regional standards, corruption in Mali is average. Narcotics laws have not changed since the 1980's.

Agreements and Treaties. Mali is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Mali is not a party to any regional agreements regarding narcotics suppression and control.

Cultivation/Production. There is little cultivation/production of narcotic substances in Mali. Law enforcement officials destroy illegal plantings when discovered, but search and destroy missions are not a priority. Law enforcement officials do not keep records on seizures.

Drug Flow/Transit. Based on limited seizures at Bamako International Airport, authorities believe that hard drugs originate in Asia and pass from Mauritania through Mali bound for other African countries. Mali's international borders are porous to passage of all manner of contraband into, through, and out of the country due to the vast largely unpopulated regions throughout the country.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). There are no high-visibility public campaigns against drug use in Mali. At the national prosecutor's office, the drug problem is not viewed as a significant threat to Malian society.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Policy Initiatives. The principle U.S. policy aim on the counternarcotics front continues to be to minimize Mali's attractiveness to drug smugglers, and thereby reduce the overall flow of illegal drugs through the country, through transit control and anti corruption measures.

The Road Ahead. Drug trafficking is really a modest problem in Mali. Mali appropriately focuses its efforts elsewhere. The United States will continue to work closely with Mali on issues of mutual interest.

Morocco

I. Summary

Morocco continues to be a major producer and exporter of cannabis. Morocco produced an estimated 47,400 metric tons of cannabis in 2003, providing for potential cannabis resin (hashish) production of 3,080 metric tons. Evidence continues to indicate the United States is not a major recipient of drugs from Morocco. In the first-ever comprehensive survey of Moroccan narcotics production, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in conjunction with the GOM's Agency for the Promotion and the Economic and Social Development of the Northern Prefectures and Provinces of the Kingdom, estimated that 134,000 hectares of land were used to cultivate cannabis in 2003, greatly surpassing the government of Morocco (GOM) earlier estimates of a growing area covering a total of 15,000-20,000 hectares. The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) study also states that approximately 800,000 Moroccans (2.7 percent of the country's estimated 2003 population) were involved in the cultivation of cannabis. Morocco effectively tolerates cannabis cultivation for want of any short-term economic alternative for those involved in its production. A major crackdown on narcotics in northern Morocco during the summer led to the arrest of a number of high-ranking regional officials. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Morocco consistently ranks among the world's largest producers and exporters of cannabis, and its cultivation and sale provide the economic base for much of northern Morocco. Only very small amounts of narcotics produced in or transiting through Morocco reach the United States. According to the UNODC report, the illicit trade in cannabis resin generates approximately \$12 billion a year, and the trade remains Morocco's primary source of hard currency.

Independent estimates indicate that the returns from cannabis cultivation range from \$16,400- \$29,800 per hectare, compared with an average of \$1,000 per hectare for one possible alternative, corn. According to EU law enforcement officials, Moroccan cannabis is typically processed into cannabis resin or oil and exported to Europe, Algeria, and Tunisia. To date, Morocco has no enterprises that use dual-use precursor chemicals, and is thus neither a source nor transit point for them.

While there has been a small but growing domestic market for harder drugs such as heroin and cocaine, cannabis remains the traditional drug of choice for Moroccans. There is no substantial evidence of trafficking in harder drugs.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. The GOM's partnership with the UNODC in conducting the 2003 cannabis survey reflects the GOM's most significant effort to date to compile accurate data about narcotics production, possibly reflecting a desire to more earnestly address narcotics production in northern Morocco. Throughout the 1980's, the GOM worked in conjunction with the United Nations to find a response to the unique geographic, cultural and economic circumstances that confront the many people involved in the cultivation of cannabis in northern Morocco. Joint projects to provide alternative agricultural products included providing goats for dairy farming, apple trees, and small bee-keeping projects. This effort also included paved roads, modern irrigation networks, and health and veterinary clinics.

Morocco has legislation providing the maximum allowable prison sentence for drug offenses to 30 years, as well as fines for narcotics violations in a range of \$20,000-\$80,000. Ten years imprisonment remains the typical sentence for major drug traffickers arrested in Morocco.

Law Enforcement Efforts. As part of a 1992 counter narcotics initiative launched by the late King Hassan, an estimated 10,000 police were detailed to drug interdiction efforts in the North and Rif mountains in 1995. Since then, approximately every six months, the GOM has rotated personnel into this region and continued to maintain narcotics checkpoints. Moroccan forces also staff observation posts along the Mediterranean coast, and the Moroccan Navy carries out routine sea patrols and responds to summons for a reaction force by the observation posts.

None of these efforts, however, have changed the underlying reality of extensive cannabis cultivation and trafficking in northern Morocco. Indeed, cannabis cultivation continues to expand throughout the Northern Rif region.

Corruption. It is unlikely that the extensive cannabis production in Morocco could be undertaken without the involvement of at least some government and law enforcement officials. In August, a GOM investigation resulted in the arrest of numerous government, judicial, and law enforcement officials in northern Morocco linked to narcotics-related corruption, as well as the detention of a major drug baron. Trials of those arrested were underway during the latter part of the year.

Agreements and Treaties. A bilateral mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) has been in force between Morocco and the United States since 1993. Morocco is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, and ratified the 1972 Protocol amending the Single Convention in March 2002. Morocco is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cultivation/Production. The center of cannabis production continues to be the province of Chefchaouen, although production has expanded in the last 20 years north to the outskirts of Tangiers. Small farmers in the Northern Rif region cultivate most cannabis, where an estimated 10 percent of arable land is dedicated to its cultivation. Production is also carried out on a smaller scale in the Souss valley of the South. The UNODC survey found that 75 percent of villages and 96,600 farms in the Rif region cultivate cannabis, representing 6.5 percent of all farms in Morocco. The GOM has stated its commitment to the total eradication of cannabis production, but given the economic dependence on cannabis in Morocco's northern region, eradication is only feasible if accompanied by a highly subsidized crop substitution program. The amount of cannabis production measured in 2003 suggests that the crop's cultivation has seen a steady increase over the past few years, to the detriment of other agricultural activities. The UNODC report warned that this agricultural mono-culture represents an extreme danger to the ecosystem, as the extensive use of fertilizers and forest removal continue to be the methods of choice to make room for cannabis cultivation.

Drug Flow/Transit. The primary ports of export for Moroccan cannabis are Oued Lalou, Martil and Bou Ahmed on the Mediterranean coast. Most large shipments headed toward Spain travel via fishing vessels and yachts. Smaller shipments have also been confiscated on small local "zodiac rafts." Smugglers also continue to ship cannabis via truck and car through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, crossing the Straits of Gibraltar by ferry. According to the UNODC, Spain continues to have the world's largest seizures of cannabis resin (57 percent of global seizures and 75 percent of European seizures). Given the proximity of Morocco, and its known role in cannabis production, it seems likely that Spain is a massive transfer point for Moroccan cannabis resin. Indications that cannabis was even being exported by helicopter emerged from investigations following a helicopter crash in the Rif region in 2002. In 2001, Moroccan authorities seized 61.35 metric tons of cannabis resin, the world's third largest figure; data on later seizures have not yet been published.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The GOM does not acknowledge a significant hard drug addiction problem and does not actively promote reduction in domestic demand for cannabis. It has established a program to train the staffs of psychiatric hospitals in the treatment of drug addiction.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. U.S. policy goals in Morocco are designed to provide training in law enforcement techniques and to promote the GOM's adherence to its obligations under relevant bilateral and international agreements. U.S.-supported efforts to strengthen money-laundering laws and efforts against terrorist financing may also contribute to the GOM's ability to monitor the flow of money from the cannabis trade.

The Road Ahead. The United States will continue to monitor the narcotics situation in Morocco, cooperate with the GOM in its counter narcotics efforts, and, together with the EU, provide law enforcement training, intelligence, and other support where possible.

Mozambique

I. Summary

Mozambique is a transit country for illegal drugs such as hashish, herbal cannabis, cocaine, mandrax (methaqualone), and heroin consumed in Europe and South Africa. Some hashish shipments passing through Mozambique find their way to the United States and Canada. The country's porous borders, poorly policed seacoast, and inadequately trained and equipped law enforcement agencies facilitate transshipment of narcotics to South Africa. Drug production is limited to herbal cannabis cultivation and a few mandrax laboratories. Available evidence suggests significant use of herbal cannabis and limited consumption of "club drugs" (ecstasy/MDMA, etc.), prescription medicines, and heroin among the urban elite. The Mozambican government recognizes drug use and drug trafficking as serious problems, but has limited resources to address these issues. Cooperation programs with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ("UNODC") and bilateral donors have attempted to improve training of drug control officials and provide better interdiction and laboratory equipment. Corruption in the police and judiciary significantly hampers counternarcotics efforts. Mozambique is a party to the 1998 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Mozambique is not a significant producer of illegal drugs. Herbal cannabis for local consumption is produced throughout the country, particularly in Tete, Nampula, and Cabo Delgado provinces. Limited amounts are exported to neighboring countries, particularly South Africa. Some factories producing mandrax for the South African market were raided and closed down in 1995, 2000, and 2002. Mozambique's role has grown rapidly as a drug-transit country. Southwest Asian producers ship cannabis resin (hashish) and synthetic drugs through Mozambique to Europe and South Africa. Limited quantities of these shipments may also reach the United States and Canada. Reports from the Mozambican Office for the Prevention and Fight Against Drugs (GCPCD) indicate that heroin and other opiate derivatives shipped through Mozambique originate in Southeast Asia. Increasing amounts of cocaine from Colombia and Brazil transit Portugal and Angola or Mozambique (all Portuguese speaking countries) on their way to South Africa. International flights from Lisbon to Maputo and from Dar es Salaam to Pemba provide a conduit for smuggling into South Africa. With the assistance of the South African police, numerous arrests were made in 2003 of drug couriers originating in Brazil, who transit Mozambique from Portugal in route to Johannesburg or continue through Johannesburg to Maputo to take advantage of the relatively lax controls disembarking in Maputo. Mozambique is not a producer of precursor chemicals.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Accomplishments. Mozambique's accomplishments in meeting its goals under the 1988 UN Drug Convention remain limited. Government resources devoted to the counternarcotics effort are meager, and only limited donor funds are available. Mozambique is cooperating with the UNODC through two assistance projects designed to increase law enforcement capacity and border control. Local law enforcement agents in some provinces have destroyed cannabis crops. In 1995, 2000, and 2002, Mozambique cooperated with South Africa in raiding mandrax factories near Maputo. Mozambican officials also seized assets connected with the production of mandrax, but not assets related to profits derived from drug sales. The Mozambican government carries out drug education programs in local schools in cooperation with bilateral and multilateral donors as part of its demand reduction efforts.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Mozambique's drug unit, which operates in Maputo and reports to the Chief of the Criminal Investigation Police, received refresher training in drug interdiction techniques as part of a UNODC program in 2001 and 2002. Under this program, 20 officers were hired and trained to staff drug units. Drug detection equipment was installed at border posts, ports, and airports. Customs officers at Maputo airport and seaport have received drug interdiction training under a UNODC program. The UNODC is working with customs agents at land borders as part of a program with Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland. Publicized seizures in 2003 include:

- The seizure of heroin being smuggled from Brazil via Lisbon by two couriers at Maputo Mavalane International Airport in October and November and the arrest in South Africa in December of a Tanzanian national identified by the couriers.
- The seizure by customs officials of 9.3 kilograms of cocaine found in the baggage of a passenger arriving at Mavalane Airport in December.
- The detention in November 2003 of three senior police officers in Inhambane province for trafficking in hashish and marijuana. The drugs were seized from a Pakistani national in 2001.
- The seizure of 75 kilograms of a chemical used in the manufacture of mandrax found in a parked car on a busy street in Maputo in November.
- The arrest in May at Mavalane Airport of a Tanzanian national smuggling 2 kilograms of cocaine in his stomach.

Mozambique has not received requests for the extradition of drug-related suspects.

Corruption. Corruption is pervasive in Mozambique. Mozambique has not prosecuted government officials for corruption relating to the production, processing, or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs or controlled substances, nor has it prosecuted any individual for discouraging the investigation or prosecution of such acts. Despite a good deal of suspicion that corruption has an effect on Mozambique's efforts against narcotics, there is no credible evidence that high level officials facilitate narcotics trafficking, and certainly as official policy, Mozambique seeks to enforce its laws against narcotics trafficking.

Agreements and Treaties. Mozambique is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Mozambique has signed, but has not yet ratified, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is cultivated in Nampula, Zambezia, Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Tete, Manica, and Sofala provinces. The Mozambican government has no estimates on crop size. Intercropping is reportedly common.

Drug Flow/Transit. Assessments of drugs transiting Mozambique are based upon limited seizure data and observations of local and UNODC officials. Mozambique increasingly serves as a transit country for hashish, cannabis resin, heroin, and Mandrax originating in Southwest Asia, owing to its long, unpatrolled coastline, lack of resources for interdiction and sea, air, and land borders, and growing transportation links with neighboring countries. Drugs destined for the South African and European markets arrive in Mozambique by small ship, especially in the coastal areas of the northern provinces, including islands off Cabo Delgado and Nampula.

The Maputo corridor border crossing at Ressano Garcia/Lebombo is an important transit point. Hashish and heroin are also shipped on to Europe, and there is evidence that some hashish may reach Canada and the United States, but not in significant quantities. Arrests in Brazil, Mozambique and South Africa indicate cocaine is being shipped by drug couriers from Colombia and Brazil to

Mozambique through Lisbon for onward shipment to South Africa and East Asia. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence that Nigerian and Tanzanian cocaine traffickers have targeted Mozambique as a gateway to the South African and European markets.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The primary substances of abuse are alcohol and herbal cannabis. Heroin, cocaine, and “club drug” usage and prescription drug abuse are also reported among Mozambique's urban elite. The GCPCD has developed a drug education program for use in schools. It has provided the material to a number of local NGOs for use in their drug education programs. The Maputo GCPCD office conducted an education program aimed at youth in 2001. The program included plays and lectures in schools, churches, and other places where youth gather. The Sofala provincial GCPCD office has created a community volunteer educational program. As in 2002, funds were not available in 2003 for continuation of these education programs beyond major cities. Drug abuse and treatment options are scarce. The GCPCD is seeking donor assistance in creating three regional treatment centers in Maputo, Beira, and Nampula.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. The USG sends Mozambican law enforcement officials and prosecutors to regional training programs through the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) for Africa in Botswana. Law enforcement officials have also received training at ILEA New Mexico. The State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs provided support to the attorney general's anticorruption unit and the police sciences academy (ACIPOL). The funds provide for training, specialized course instruction, instructor development, and curriculum development for ACIPOL. The anticorruption unit, which began operations in November 2002, has received specialized training and advisor visits through the Department of Justice OPDAT (Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training) program, as well as renovation of its office facility, up-dated information technology equipment, and office furniture, funded by USAID. The Department of Defense has assisted the Mozambican Navy to develop a plan for improved coastal surveillance activities, and is providing training to Mozambican military personnel.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. expects to continue cooperation with Mozambique to improve capacity to detect and prosecute narcotics-related crime..

Namibia

I. Summary.

While occasionally used as a drug transit point, Namibia is not a major drug producer or exporter. 2003 saw a slight increase in drug seizures in Namibia, and drug abuse remains an issue of concern, especially among economically disadvantaged groups. Narcotics enforcement is the responsibility of the Namibian Police's Drug Law Enforcement Unit (DLEU), which lacks the manpower, resources and equipment required to fully address the domestic drug trade and transshipment issues. Namibia, which is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, has not received any USG assistance in the past two years.

II. Status of Country.

Namibia is not a significant producer of drugs or precursor chemicals. No drug production facilities were discovered in Namibia in 2003. Namibia's excellent port facilities and road network combine with weak border enforcement to make it an ideal transshipment point for drugs en route to the larger and more lucrative South African market. DLEU personnel believe much of the transshipment takes place via shipping containers either offloaded at the port of Walvis Bay or entering overland from Angola and transported via truck to Botswana, Zambia and South Africa. Personnel constraints, a lack of training and low motivation among working-level customs and immigration officers at Namibia's land border posts all prevent adequate container inspection and interception of contraband.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. Namibia has requested United Nations (UNDOC) assistance in completing a National Drug Master Plan, which is still being formulated. While Namibia has not announced plans to become a party to the Convention, many Convention requirements are already reflected in Namibian law, which states that illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and financing of narcotics are all criminal offenses.

The Namibian Government is currently drafting legislation regarding money laundering and asset forfeiture as part of a general effort to modernize statutes relating to terrorism and organized crime. Both the money laundering and asset forfeiture legislation will encompass narcotics-related activities.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Namibia fully participates in regional law enforcement cooperation efforts against narcotics trafficking, especially through the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs' Cooperative Organization (SARCCO). The Minister of Home Affairs meets regularly with counterparts from neighboring countries, during which efforts to combat cross-border contraband shipment (including narcotics trafficking) are reportedly discussed.

Corruption. No incidents of narcotics-related public corruption were reported in 2003. Namibia's National Assembly authorized and provided funding for the creation of an anticorruption commission, which will be responsible for investigating all cases of public malfeasance. The organization should begin operations by mid-2004.

Agreements and Treaties. Namibia is not a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. However, Namibia is a party to the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. While there is no US-Namibia bilateral extradition treaty, narcotics offenses are extraditable under Namibian law. Namibian law also allows for the

provision of mutual legal assistance as described in the 1988 UN Drug Convention. However, Namibia received no such requests for extradition or mutual legal assistance in 2003. Namibia has also signed and ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and two of its three Protocols.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). While there are no major demand reduction campaigns underway in Namibia, drug treatment programs are available from private clinics, and to a lesser extent from public facilities. Approximately 80 percent of treatment cases in Namibia are for alcohol abuse, with the remainder divided evenly between cannabis and mandrax (methaqualone).

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The USG continues to offer Namibia opportunities for fully funded law enforcement training programs at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Gaborone, Botswana. Most of these training programs contain counternarcotics elements, and some narcotics-specific training is also offered. While representatives of several law enforcement agencies (Customs, Immigration, Prison Service) and prosecutors have participated in ILEA training, the Namibian Police have declined to do so.

The Namibian Police have repeatedly stated their willingness to cooperate with the USG on any future narcotics-related investigations. There were no USG requests for assistance with specific narcotics cases in 2003.

The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to encourage the Namibian Police to take advantage of training opportunities at ILEA Botswana, and will assist the Government of Namibia in any narcotics investigation with a U.S. nexus.

Nigeria

I. Summary

Nigeria remains a hub of narcotics trafficking and money laundering activity. Nigerian criminal organizations dominate the African drug trade and transport narcotics to markets in the United States, Europe, Asia, and other parts of Africa. Some of these same organizations are engaged in advance-fee fraud, commonly referred to in Nigeria as “419 Fraud,” and other forms of defrauding U.S. citizens and businesses as well as citizens and businesses of other countries. Severe unemployment after years of military rule and an associated economic decline contributed significantly to the continuation and expansion of drug trafficking, widespread corruption and other criminal acts in Nigeria.

These factors, combined with Nigeria's central location along the major trafficking routes and access to global narcotics markets, provided both an incentive and mechanism for criminal groups to flourish. Nigeria is still ranked as one of the world's most corrupt countries. Heroin from Southeast and Southwest Asia, smuggled via Nigeria, accounts for a significant portion of the heroin reaching the United States. Nigerian criminal elements, operating in South America, trans-ship cocaine through Nigeria to Europe, Asia, and Africa. South Africa is a major destination for Nigerian-trafficked cocaine within Africa. Nigerian-grown marijuana is exported to neighboring West African countries and to Europe, but not in significant quantities to the United States. Aside from marijuana, Nigeria does not produce any of the drugs that its nationals traffic.

No Nigerian law enforcement agency or Commission has received its current annual budget although they claim that their budgets have been approved. Although the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) enjoyed successes in interdiction at the international airports, their efforts were short of expectations due mainly to inadequate funding. All law enforcement agencies suffered slowdowns in activities while the country concentrated on local, state and national elections in April 2003. More than seventy-five percent of the National Assembly turned over. The USG enjoys high cooperation with the new Attorney General who took office in July 2003. Cooperation among Nigeria's law enforcement agencies still leaves much to be desired. Although all law enforcement elements are represented at the international airports and at the ports, joint operations among them are virtually non-existent. A missing ingredient in the apprehension of a major trafficker or the interdiction of a major shipment of contraband is interagency cooperation. No single law enforcement agency in Nigeria has adequate resources to combat the increasingly sophisticated international criminal networks that operate in and through the country, so better cooperation among them is an imperative. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Nigeria does not produce precursor chemicals or drugs that have a significant effect on the United States, but is a major drug-transit country. In addition, Nigerian criminal elements operate global trafficking/criminal networks, which traffic drugs around the world. Nigerian drug organizations are also heavily involved in corollary criminal activities such as document fabrication, illegal immigration, and financial fraud. Their ties to criminals in the United States, Europe, South America, Asia, and South Africa are well documented. Nigerian poly-crime organizations exact significant financial and societal costs, especially among West African states with limited resources for countering these organizations.

The NDLEA is the law enforcement agency with sole responsibility for combating narcotics trafficking and drug abuse in Nigeria. Established in 1989, NDLEA works alongside Nigerian Customs, the State Security Service, the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and

Control, the National Police, and the Nigerian Immigration Service at various ports of entry. The NDLEA's most successful interdictions have taken place at Nigeria's international airports, with the majority of hard drug seizures (e.g. cocaine and heroin) at the airport in Lagos.

Increasing numbers of drug couriers are being apprehended at the airport in Abuja. NDLEA has successfully apprehended individual drug couriers transiting these airports but only a few of the drug traffickers sponsoring these couriers. Efforts similar to the vigorous inspections conducted at the Lagos and Abuja international airports are needed at Nigeria's five major seaports as smugglers change their tactics to avoid detection.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. NDLEA created State Commands—local offices in each Nigerian administrative jurisdiction—to ensure a comprehensive nationwide presence of the Agency. Thus, the agency now has 37 State Commands in addition to the national headquarters and nine Special Area Commands. Additionally, the computerization of the agency's administrative and accounting statistics ensures greater efficiency and transparency. The NDLEA also sponsored several events to increase awareness of drug abuse among school age children and hosted, with private sponsors, a money laundering workshop to explain to banks and other financial institutions their role in stemming money-laundering activity in the country.

The continuity provided by the current NDLEA Chairman, Alhaji Bello Lafiaji, has exacted a greater measure of commitment and loyalty from the NDLEA field personnel and staff and has resulted in increased efforts and training opportunities at all levels of the agency. As an example of NDLEA's commitment to trained personnel and regional cooperation, Nigeria has contributed \$2,000,000 towards a five-year \$6,000,000 UNODC project to convert the NDLEA Academy in Jos to a Regional Law Enforcement Training Center. The first phase of the project is underway.

Accomplishments. The NDLEA continues its successful interdiction of couriers destined for the U.K. and U.S. through Murtala Mohammed International Airport in Lagos as well as Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport in Abuja. NDLEA helped intercept over \$3,000,000 worth of fraudulent checks and, with the added cooperation of Federal Express, over \$200,000 in merchandise that had been purchased with stolen credit cards was returned to the respective vendors.

The NDLEA has assumed a leadership role in drug enforcement in the region. With DEA assistance, the NDLEA created the West African Joint Operation (WAJO) initiative, bringing together drug enforcement personnel from 15 countries in the region to improve regional cooperation. A DEA-assisted WAJO planning conference will be held in The Gambia in early 2004. The NDLEA continues expanded counternarcotics cooperation with the police in South Africa, where Nigerian criminal organizations are believed to be responsible for the bulk of drug trafficking.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Seizures of hard drugs in 2003 were modest, with cocaine and heroin totaling 130 kilograms and 70 kilograms respectively; no one seizure exceeded 15 kilograms. NDLEA also seized more than 937 kilograms of synthetic drugs and more than 530,000 kilograms of cannabis. Similar successes have been recorded by the NDLEA State Commands, with one State arresting 58 persons and seizing 1,700 kilograms of cannabis, 10 kilograms of cocaine and 9 kilograms of heroin between September and November 2003. NDLEA achieved limited success in combating the various elements of the drug trade during 2003. Typically, street pushers and trafficker “mules” were apprehended; the effort against large-scale traffickers, however, was less effective. NDLEA continues to incur resistance from the Nigerian Customs Service to NDLEA presence at the major seaports, where NDLEA agents are viewed as competitors as opposed to collaborators.

Using special drug courts, a more energetic approach by the NDLEA to prosecute drug traffickers efficiently and successfully resulted in over 2,300 arrests and 841 prosecutions from January through

October 2003. Major narcotics smugglers and their networks continue to elude arrest and prosecution, despite a NDLEA commitment to launch an intensified effort to investigate major international drug traffickers operating in Nigeria. Attempts by the NDLEA to arrest and prosecute major traffickers and their associates often fail in Nigeria's courts, which are subject to intimidation and corruption.

Nigerian counternarcotics efforts primarily focus on interdiction at Nigeria's air and seaports, which normally nets couriers originating or transiting to Europe or the U.S. Another area for enforcement emphasis is a public campaign focused on destroying marijuana crops throughout the country. Asset seizures from narcotics traffickers and money launderers, while permitted under Nigerian law, have never been systematically utilized as an enforcement tool, but some convicted traffickers have had their assets forfeited over the years. The number of traffickers so far penalized, however, remains small.

The Government of Nigeria continues to work on a mechanism to process U.S. extradition requests expeditiously while observing due process under Nigerian law. Currently, a dedicated prosecutorial team handles all U.S. extradition cases before a specifically designated High Court judge, but extradition cases can still take significant time. The last extradition was in late 2002. There is one extradition case pending before the court and another individual in custody awaiting extradition hearings.

Corruption. Corruption has for many years permeated Nigerian society and continues to be a systemic problem in Nigeria's government. Unemployment is very high and civil servants' salaries are low. In addition, salaries are frequently paid months in arrears, compounding the corruption problem. The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Commission (ICPC) has weathered several storms, including an attempt by the last session of the National Assembly to repeal the Anti-Corruption Act 2001 and replace it with a watered-down version that virtually exempted lawmakers from prosecution. Recent high profile ICPC investigations and arrests have resulted in cabinet level officials being charged, dismissed from their post and incarcerated while awaiting hearings on corruption charges.

None of these actions was for drug-related offenses. USG technical assistance, funded through the State Department Drug Assistance Program and implemented by the U.S. Department of Justice, has entered a second phase providing the ICPC with additional training and technical assistance, including a Resident Legal Advisor for its staff in early 2004.

Agreements and Treaties. Nigeria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Nigeria has ratified the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, and the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants. The 1931 U.S.-UK Extradition Treaty, which was made applicable to Nigeria in 1935, is the legal basis for pending U.S. extradition requests. The U.S.-Nigeria Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) entered into force on January 14, 2003.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis is the only illicit drug produced in large quantities in Nigeria. The drug is cultivated in all 36 states. Major cultivation takes place in central and northern Nigeria and in the Delta and Ondo states in the south. Marijuana, or "Indian Hemp" as it is known locally, is sold in Nigeria and exported throughout West Africa and into Europe. To date, there is no evidence of significant marijuana imports from Nigeria into the United States. The NDLEA has pursued an aggressive eradication campaign. For 2003, the NDLEA claimed to have discovered and destroyed more than 159,202 hectares of cannabis.

Drug Flow/Transit. Nigeria is a major staging point for Southeast and Southwest Asian heroin smuggled to Europe and the United States and for South American cocaine trafficked to Europe. While Nigeria remains Africa's drug transit hub, there are indications that the preferred methods of

transshipment have changed. The NDLEA unit at Lagos' Murtala Mohammed International Airport conducts 100 percent searches of passengers and carry-on baggage. This is extremely significant given the addition of World Airways direct flights to the U.S. from Lagos that started in May 2003. The enhanced security posture at this airport has prompted some drug traffickers to use Nigerian seaports, concealing large quantities of contraband in shipping containers. They also seem to have switched to other West African airports and seaports with less stringent security controls.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). Local production and use of marijuana have been a problem in Nigeria for some time; however, according to the NDLEA and NGOs, the abuse of harder drugs (e.g., cocaine, heroin) is now on the rise. Heroin and cocaine are readily available in many of Nigeria's larger cities. The NDLEA continues to expand its counternarcotics clubs at Nigerian universities and distribute counternarcotics literature. The NDLEA also has instituted a teacher's manual for primary and secondary schools, which offers guidance on teaching students about drug abuse. NDLEA sponsored a nationwide contest between primary and secondary schools with public presentations held at the "UN Day Against Drugs" ceremony in 2003.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. U.S.-Nigerian counternarcotics cooperation focuses on interdiction efforts at major international entry points and on enhancing the professionalism of the NDLEA and other law enforcement agencies. U.S. training programs, technical assistance and equipment donations have continued, with the NDLEA as the primary target. The DEA country office in Nigeria works with the NDLEA Joint Task Force and other operations personnel to train, coordinate, plan and implement internal and regional interdiction operations. At all levels, USG representatives enjoy excellent access to their counterparts and there is an evident desire on both sides to strengthen these relationships. The current NDLEA chairman is committed to meeting agency goals and improving the morale of NDLEA officers.

The United States and Nigeria signed a Letter of Agreement covering many aspects of law enforcement assistance, including a new U.S.-funded police reform program in 2002. The Agreement has been amended three times to increase assistance for Nigerian law enforcement to support the Police Service Commission, ICPC, and Trafficking In Persons projects. Additional equipment will be provided for the NDLEA Joint Task Force and all law enforcement agencies will be included in future training in an effort to promote better cooperation and collaboration in areas of mutual interest.

Bilateral Accomplishments. A high level U.S.-Nigeria law enforcement dialogue, initiated by Nigeria in 2001, was renewed in December 2002 and ended with pledges by both Governments to accomplish certain objectives before the next meeting. Due to Nigerian national elections in April and delays in filling key positions, the GON has agreed to delay the scheduled 2003 meeting until March/April 2004. The meeting is planned for Washington, to be hosted by the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The new Attorney General, Chief Akinlolu Olujinmi, will lead the Nigerian delegation. The majority of the goals and objectives resulting from the December 2002 meeting have been met or exceeded. As with the last two meetings, the next meeting will cover the full range of U.S. and Nigerian law enforcement interests: drug control; financial fraud; trafficking in persons; corruption; immigration crimes; police reform; extradition; and money laundering.

The Road Ahead. After years of non-cooperation, the U.S. and Nigeria enjoy an excellent relationship and improved cooperation on the law enforcement front. Federal funding for Nigerian law enforcement agencies and key anticrime agencies, however, remains insufficient and erratic in disbursement. This affects the planning and consistency of actions on the part of these agencies, giving the impression of lack of commitment and ineffectiveness. Unless the Nigerian Government remedies this situation, very little progress will be made and none sustained. It will require strong and sustained

political will and continued international assistance for any Nigerian government to confront these difficult issues and bring about meaningful change. The U.S. government has expanded aid to Nigeria's counternarcotics efforts; counternarcotics assistance provided since February 2001 now totals over \$1.5 million.

The police remain grossly mistrusted by the Nigerian populace and organized crime groups continue to exploit that mistrust by preying on citizens throughout the country. Nigerian police are poorly trained. A new recruit curriculum and a separate mid-level in-service training program designed by Department of Justice advisors are being presented in Kaduna and Kano police colleges. The Program focuses on community policing, civil disorder management and criminal investigation; it will be emphasized during the remainder of the multi-year police modernization program. In an encouraging commitment to professionalism in police work, NDLEA has mandated that all their officers undergo re-training at the basic level and mid-level before qualifying for promotion under the new promotion program. Implementation of a 2001 Presidential order to recruit 40,000 new police constables each year will challenge the Nigerian system. The Government of Nigeria needs to prioritize its commitment of resources to ensure the success of this ambitious recruiting program.

The U.S. government will continue to work with Nigeria on the issues of counternarcotics, money laundering and other international crimes. There has been measurable success and a renewed commitment to drafting legislation that enhances the capabilities of Nigeria's law enforcement community in the past year. All branches of government support these goals, but performing up to their own standards over the long-term has been more challenging.

The underlying institutional and societal factors that contribute to narcotics trafficking, money laundering and other criminal activities in Nigeria are deep-seated and require a comprehensive and collaborative effort at all levels of law enforcement and government. Progress can only be made through sustained effort, political will, and continued support of the affected international community.

Rwanda

I. Summary

Rwanda does not have a significant drug-abuse or trafficking problem, although police contacts suggested that the problem had become slightly worse relative to last year. The main drugs at issue were cannabis (which may be imported but is also grown in Nyungwe Forest) and heroin. Sources felt that most of the users, particularly of heroin, have not grown up in Rwanda; the problem seems generally to be limited to some districts of Kigali and is almost unknown in the countryside. Government officials attempt to address the problem primarily through programs designed to prevent drug abuse from spreading from the existing small abuser group.

II. Status of Country

According to police sources, Rwanda does not have a large trafficking problem. Some cannabis from Nyungwe may be sold in Burundi. Otherwise, some cannabis may also be grown in the Virungas Park in Uganda and DRC, and can be relatively easily transported through the forest by the local population, as the borders in that region are porous. Raids, however, have only netted about 30 kilograms of cannabis this year. There is a smaller problem associated with heroin, which police believe is being imported from Uganda and the Congo, and used primarily by well-off urban youth.

The police have a dedicated drug unit, and other branches of the police also pursue drug-related offences. Any illegal drugs found are seized, and the police and the prosecution service take drug-related crime very seriously. Police sources say that prosecution difficulties arise due to a lack of training among all police regarding drug-related procedures and rights.

The GOR monitors all monetary transfers totaling more than \$50,000 (ref B), information the police say they can access if necessary. However, nobody believes the problem is significant or organized enough in Rwanda that someone could be getting rich off the illicit trafficking of drugs.

The GOR is a party to the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Despite minimal resources, the government is attempting to meet its obligations in the following ways:

- Illicit cultivation: there is perhaps some illicit cultivation in Nyungwe Forest, for cannabis only. The police raid the forest about once a year in order to destroy any cannabis crops they find.
- Production: There is no indication of domestic drug production.
- Distribution: Distribution seems to be almost exclusively in Kigali. Traffic police can seize drugs if they are found as part of routine work.

Sniffer dogs are employed at the airport in an attempt to identify illicit drugs. The police lack sophisticated equipment to do more than that. At other customs points, officials rely on intuition & experience to try to find potential drug carriers. Drug-unit officials work with customs officials to remind them of their role in identifying drugs that could be coming in. There is a police unit against terrorism; and there will soon be one for financial crime, both of which will help ferret out suspect monetary transactions. At the moment, the drug unit does not engage in regular financial investigations. They are investigating to what extent the drug trade might be organized; it does not seem to be highly so and as such the finance angle has not received a lot of attention. The GOR does not believe there is an organized trade in illicit drugs; and, therefore, there is no one getting rich off of

their production and/or sale. The police have seized only small amounts of drugs. The police are working on drug abuse education campaigns in schools; the Ministry of Health also has a unit for the control of legal drugs and prevention of their abuse.

Saudi Arabia

I. Summary

Saudi Arabia has no appreciable drug production and is not a significant transit country. Saudi Arabia's conservative cultural and religious norms discourage drug abuse. The Saudi Government places a high priority on combating narcotics abuse and trafficking. Since 1988, the Government has imposed the death penalty for drug smuggling. Due to these factors, drug abuse and trafficking do not pose major social or law enforcement problems. However, Saudi officials acknowledge that illegal drug consumption and trafficking are on the rise. Saudi and U.S. counternarcotics officials maintain excellent relations. In 2003, the Saudi Government enacted a comprehensive money laundering law. Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Saudi Arabia has no significant drug production and, in keeping with its conservative Islamic values and 1988 UN Drug Convention obligations, places a high priority on fighting narcotics abuse and trafficking. Narcotics-related crimes are punished harshly, and narcotics trafficking is a capital offense enforced against Saudis and foreigners alike. As of December 16, 18 individuals have been executed for drug offenses in 2003, a significant increase from 2002. Saudi Arabia maintains a network of overseas drug enforcement liaison offices and state-of-the-art detection and training programs to combat trafficking.

While Saudi officials are determined in their counternarcotics efforts, drug trafficking and abuse is a growing problem. Since the Saudi government provides no statistics on drug consumption, interdiction, and trafficking, it is difficult to substantiate this assessment with hard data. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that Saudi Arabia's relatively affluent population, growing numbers of idle youth, and high profit margins on smuggled narcotics make the country an attractive target for drug traffickers and dealers.

The Saudi Government undertakes widespread counternarcotics educational campaigns in the media, health institutes, and schools. The Narcotics Police are currently collaborating with the Presidency of Youth Welfare to produce a film for schoolchildren to educate them about the dangers of illegal drugs. Government efforts to treat drug abuse are aimed solely at Saudi nationals, who are remanded to one of the nation's four drug treatment centers in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam and Qassim if found with narcotics substances. There are no separate facilities for Saudi women, and expatriate substance abusers are jailed and summarily deported. Health officials confirm anecdotal reports of an increase in drug abuse, but note that most addictions are not severe due to the scarcity of available narcotics and their diluted form. Heroin and hashish are the most heavily-consumed substances, but Saudi officials report that cocaine and amphetamines are also in demand. Paint/glue inhalation and abuse of prescription drugs is also reported.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. The lead agency in Saudi Arabia's drug interdiction efforts is the Ministry of Interior, which has over 40 overseas offices in countries representing a trafficking threat. In addition, the Saudi Government continues to play a leading role in efforts to enhance intelligence sharing among the six nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Saudi Arabia is a member of the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and its drug enforcement personnel regularly participate in international training programs.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Saudi and U.S. drug enforcement officials regularly exchange information on narcotics cases. Drug seizures, arrests, prosecutions and consumption trends are not matters of public record, although reports of drug seizures by Saudi officials appear occasionally in local newspapers. Saudi interdiction efforts tend to focus more on individual carriers than on follow-on operations designed to identify drug distributors and regional networks.

Corruption. We have no evidence of involvement by Saudi Government officials in the production, processing or shipment of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and other controlled substances.

Agreements and Treaties. There are no extradition or mutual legal assistance agreements between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, although Saudi Arabia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

Cultivation/Production. Cultivation and production of narcotics in Saudi Arabia is negligible.

Drug Flow/Transit. Saudi Arabia is not a major transshipment point. Due in part to new detection techniques employed at major points of entry, seizures of narcotics (coming primarily from Pakistan, Nigeria and Turkey) have increased. Anecdotal evidence suggests that narcotics trafficking is a growing problem via the country's land borders.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). In addition to widespread media campaigns against substance abuse, the Saudi Government sponsors drug eradication programs directed at school-age children, health care providers and mothers. Executions of convicted traffickers (public beheadings which are widely publicized) are believed by Saudi officials to serve as a deterrent to narcotics trafficking and abuse. The country's influential religious establishment actively preaches against narcotics use and government treatment facilities provide free counseling to male Saudi addicts.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia are actively working to strengthen bilateral counternarcotics cooperation.

Bilateral Cooperation. Saudi officials actively seek and participate in U.S.-sponsored training programs and are receptive to enhanced official contacts with DEA.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to arrange regular visits of DEA officers to Saudi Arabia. It will also explore opportunities for additional bilateral training and cooperation.

Senegal

I. Summary

The production and trafficking of cannabis continues to be the largest domestic narcotics problem. Trafficking of cocaine and heroin through Senegal exists, but is not a significant problem. Senegal's attempts to implement a national plan of action against drug abuse and trafficking have yet to get off the ground due to lack of funding. Senegal has made progress against money laundering through cooperation with other West African states. Senegalese authorities have been active in pursuing bilateral cooperation against international traffickers, including signing mutual assistance agreements with France and the UK. Education and strict enforcement of drug laws remain cornerstones of Senegal's counternarcotics goals. Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

While trafficking of all types of drugs, including heroin, cocaine, and psychotropic depressants, exists in Senegal, it is cannabis production and trafficking that has continued to stymie most enforcement efforts. Southern Senegal's Casamance region is the source of the cannabis trade. Unrest in the Casamance has made it almost impossible for law enforcement to identify and stop this trade. Government troops have temporarily driven traffickers out of the Casamance, but have not followed through with eradication of cannabis crops because they claim there is inadequate manpower to do so. Drug enforcement efforts have been underfunded and undermanned, allowing the illegal cannabis trade to continue unabated. Cannabis produced in the Casamance finds its way into Dakar, the capital city. Police are reluctant to undertake greater enforcement efforts against cannabis cultivation in the Casamance for fear of hampering peace negotiations between the rebels who have been involved in the insurgency and the government.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. Senegal developed a national plan of action against drug abuse and the trafficking of drugs in 1997. Multidisciplinary in its approach, Senegal's national plan includes programs to control the cultivation, production, and traffic of drugs; inform the population of the dangers of drug use; and reintroduce former drug addicts into society. Full implementation of this plan remains stalled due to funding constraints. Periodic efforts to improve coordination have been hampered because of insufficient funding. Through cooperation with other member-states in the West African Monetary Union, a uniform common law against money laundering is now being considered by the Senegalese National Assembly.

Accomplishments. Due to weak enforcement efforts and inadequate record keeping, it is impossible to assess accurately the real drug problem in the country. Senegal has in the past undertaken few cannabis eradication efforts. As previously mentioned, police forces feel constrained in their efforts to eradicate cannabis cultivation in the southern part of the country because of ongoing peace negotiations between insurgents and the central government. Meetings have been organized, though, with island populations in the south in accordance with the UN Program for International Control of Drugs to promote substitution of cannabis cultivation with that of other crops.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Given limitations on funding, training, and policy, there is only limited ability to guard Senegal's points of entry from the transiting of drugs through Dakar. The international airport has drug enforcement agents present, but they lack the training and equipment to systematically detect illegal drugs. There is no consistent monitoring of containers at the port of Dakar.

Two examples from 2003 show the use of Dakar as a transit point. More than 50 kilograms of cocaine transported through the Dakar airport was seized in London and Brussels from Belgian nationals. In addition, more than two metric tons of hashish bound for Hamburg, Germany, were seized after transit through the port of Dakar.

Despite the limitations to the creation of a more robust counternarcotics regime in Senegal, according to police officials, the number of drug seizures increases from year to year thanks to successful efforts to raise the awareness of police regarding the harmful effects of drugs. In 2003, 3,048 drug-related arrests were made in Senegal. Of these cases, 2,948 were prosecuted, which led to 1,830 convictions. The Government of Senegal (GOS) cooperated with foreign governments in two successful drug seizure operations in 2003; 6 kilograms of cocaine were seized and arrests made after cooperation with Italian authorities. At least 8,000 kilograms of cocaine were seized through the cooperation of Senegalese authorities with Spanish police. Seventeen arrests were made as a result of that five-month operation.

Corruption. Corruption is a problem for narcotics law enforcement all over Africa, but the USG is unaware of any narcotics-related corruption at senior levels of the Senegalese government. A revision to the Senegalese Penal Code to address corruption is under consideration by the National Assembly.

Agreements and Treaties. Senegal is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. Senegal is a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cultivation/Production. Although cannabis cultivation in Senegal is not a large problem in relation to the global cultivation of the drug, it could become a serious internal drug problem for Senegal.

Drug Flow/Transit. Dakar's position on the west coast of Africa and the presence of an international airport and seaport make it an enticing transit point for drug dealers. The seaport of Dakar and its international airport are the two principal points of entry/exit of drugs in Senegal. Senegalese authorities state that, because there is not a direct flight from South America, Cape Verde serves as a way station for cocaine bound for Senegal.

The Chief of OCRTIS explained that the transshipment of illicit drugs through Senegal is increasing. Thus far, hashish and cocaine have been the drugs transited through Senegal. The U.S. is not a destination point for these drugs.

Domestic Programs. NGOs, such as the Observatoire Geostrategique des Drogues et de la Deviance (OGDD), have taken the lead in public education efforts. OGDD continued a program that began in 2001. The first phase involved a campaign of information targeted at cannabis cultivators, arguing that the land had greater potential if it were used for other purposes than drugs, that drugs were bad for the environment and health, and that drugs were degrading the economy. Village committees have been established to convey the above information to sensitize people to the problems associated with drug use. The focus of the second phase of the program is to encourage farmers to substitute alternative crops for drugs on their land. Due to funding constraints, however, implementation of this part of the program has been impeded.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. USG goals and objectives in Senegal are to strengthen law enforcement capabilities in counternarcotics efforts. In 2002 the USG started a program to train counternarcotics agents in drug investigation and interdiction methods under the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau of the State Department (INL). The program provided \$220,000 for several law enforcement programs that will aid the police in all aspects of narcotics investigations and

prosecutions. Additionally, the USG provided basic drug analysis equipment and training to narcotics police and lab technicians at the national drug laboratory, and is assisting with expanding the lab into a regional facility for use by other West African Francophone countries.

The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to work closely with the Senegalese government to improve the capacity of its narcotics law enforcement officers to investigate and prosecute narcotics crimes.

South Africa

I. Summary

South Africa is committed to fighting trafficking, production and abuse of illicit narcotics, both domestically and internationally. Reliable evidence suggests that the country continues to be to be an important transit area for cocaine (from South America) and heroin (from the Far East), primarily destined for Southern African and European markets. In addition to being a large producer of cannabis, most of which is consumed in Southern Africa, South Africa may be the world's largest consumer of mandrax, a variant of methaqualone. Mandrax is the preferred drug of abuse in South Africa; it is smuggled, primarily from India, but also from China and other sources. Mandrax is the single most important money-earner for indigenous South African organized crime. A study conducted by the South African Police Service (SAPS) found that in 2003 there were 226 organized criminal syndicates active in South Africa. At least 120 are known to be involved in drug trafficking. According to an Institute for Security Studies report, most of those syndicates are run by third country nationals, primarily Nigerians, Pakistanis, and Indians. South Africa is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

South Africa's transition to democracy and its integration into the world economy have been accompanied by the increased use of its territory for the transshipment of contraband of all kinds, including narcotics. Porous borders and an over-stretched criminal justice system make South Africa a tempting target for international organized crime groups of all types. With assistance from the U.S. and other donors, South Africa is making progress in crafting an appropriate response to this situation.

South Africa has for some time been the origin, transit point, or terminus of many major smuggling routes; this was particularly so during the apartheid period. Trends and practices begun in the sanctions-busting apartheid period continue into the present; rather than embargoed items, drugs and other illicit items now are smuggled into and out of South Africa. Additionally, South Africa has the most developed transportation, communications and banking systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. The country's modern telecommunications systems (particularly wireless telephones), its direct air links with South America, Asia and Europe and its permeable land borders provide opportunities for regional and international trafficking in all forms of contraband, including narcotics. Narcotics trafficking is very profitable for organized crime syndicates and they have become heavily involved in stealing vehicles and trading them across South Africa's land borders for narcotics.

South Africa continues to rank among the world's largest producers of cannabis (4th largest according to the South African Institute for Security Studies); however, this production does not have a significant effect on the U.S. Cannabis produced in South Africa is either consumed locally, or exported to countries other than the U.S. Smuggling of cannabis to Europe continues to increase. There are currently 36 South Africans in Irish prisons for drug trafficking and there has been an increase in marijuana seizures in Ireland from 128 kilograms in 2000 to 3.2 metric tons in 2002, mostly from South Africa.

South Africa is also becoming a larger producer of synthetic drugs, mainly mandrax, with increasing smuggling of precursor chemicals, and more and more labs in South Africa established. The South African Police Service has dismantled a large number of labs this year and is trying to better track the smuggling of precursor chemicals.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. In October 2001, the Parliament passed the Financial Intelligence Center Act (FICA), which mandates reporting and record keeping of certain financial transactions. The Financial Intelligence Center (“FIC”) began work in February 2003. In June, 2003, South Africa was admitted to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and to the Egmont Group, strengthening its money-laundering control capacity and international connections.

Combating the abuse, production and trafficking in illicit narcotics is an important component of the anticrime agenda of the South African Government (SAG). As a practical matter, however, the SAG tends to target its limited anticrime resources on serious, violent and domestic crime. South Africa has one of the world's highest rates of murder and rape. South Africa's porous borders are crossed daily by criminals trafficking in all sorts of contraband, including, but not limited to: illicit drugs, stolen cars, illegal firearms, diamonds, precious metals and human beings. The Cabinet interagency “Justice Cluster” works to help coordinate the law enforcement and criminal justice system's response to these challenges. As of September 2003, the Narcotics Bureau (SANAB) has been fully integrated into the South African Police Service's 41 organized crime units. Those units claim that drug trafficking is their number one priority; however, there is no solid evidence of that fact. In addition, it is too early to tell if the integration has had any real effect on the targeting and investigating of drug-related crime in South Africa.

The South Africa Police Service plans to continue its broad based strategy of focusing on dismantling illicit drug labs, interdicting precursor chemicals, targeting ethnic-based trafficking organizations, and concentrating on operations at the Johannesburg International Airport.

Accomplishments. In 2003, the SAG and other law enforcement agencies met the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Prosecutors increased their use of the Prevention of Organized Crime Act, and the establishment of the FIC gave more credibility to the country's anti-money laundering efforts. The FIC has grown into a viable center of financial analysis of suspicious transactions, and this analysis will ultimately help combat drug trafficking.

Law enforcement entities in South Africa continued this year to make record drug busts of mandrax, Ecstasy (MDMA) and precursor chemicals. However, they have not moved further in dismantling the kingpins who are responsible for importing and exporting drugs to South Africa.

The conviction rate for drug offenses is high in South Africa, averaging about 70 percent. As of June 2003, 6,904 individuals had been sentenced for drug related crimes, an increase of 18 percent from 2002. Approximately 1,035 of those sentenced were not South Africans.

The SAG also appreciates the relationship between violent crimes and the use of drugs. The Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula, addressing a meeting of diplomats and journalists, said that most violent crimes are committed on weekends, by people under the influence of drugs and alcohol.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The SAPS seized large amounts of drugs during the periods April 2002-March 2003 and July-September 2003, including 210 kilograms of cocaine. There were also drug seizures made by other law enforcement entities, including the Scorpions, a special unit targeting organized crime. In November 2003 the Scorpions publicly destroyed 5 million mandrax tablets, which they had seized during 2000-2003. In July 2003 the Scorpions seized 4 tons of mandrax powder, the largest bust in South Africa history. That same month, the SAPS made its biggest seizure of precursor chemicals and mandrax tablets, but the mandrax tablets were stolen several months later from a SAPS warehouse. The police service also detected, seized and dismantled 36 clandestine labs, which were producing methamphetamines and other synthetic drugs. In August 2003, the police busted a Pretoria drug lab, which produced a large amount of methcathinone (“cat”), with product worth about \$83,000.

Corruption. Officials accused of corruption can be prosecuted under the 1992 Corruption Act, although the capacity to combat corruption will be greatly enhanced by the new Prevention of Corruption Bill once it is enacted. The SAG has also adopted a Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy. The SAPS Act of 1995 provides for the Independent Complaints Directorate (ICD) which is active in fighting corruption within the police force. Of all the offences by police officers investigated by the ICD, about 10.5 percent represent corruption in diverse forms, according to the latest ICD Report. Accusations of police corruption are frequent although the experience of enforcement officers working at the U.S. Embassy Pretoria is that many of the failures and lapses by the police can be attributed as much to a lack of training, low salaries and poor morale as to corruption. Credible evidence of narcotics-related corruption among South African law enforcement officials has not been brought to light, although many suspect it exists. Some suspect that the reported quantities of seized drugs are lower than the actual figures. Some amount of corruption and much malfeasance among border control officials does appear to contribute to the permeability of South Africa's borders.

Agreements and Treaties. South Africa is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and has signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The U.S. and South Africa have bilateral extradition and mutual legal assistance agreements in force, as well as a Letter of Agreement on Anticrime and Counter-narcotics Assistance. The Letter of Agreement provides for U.S. training and commodity assistance to several South African law enforcement agencies. In 2000 the U.S. and South Africa signed a Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement, which is not yet in force.

Cultivation/Production. Cannabis, or “dagga,” grows wild in Southern Africa and is a traditional crop in many rural areas, particularly the eastern Cape and Kwa Zulu-Natal provinces. It also grows wild and is cultivated in neighboring Swaziland and Lesotho. It is possible to have three cannabis crops a year in South Africa. Most South African cannabis is consumed domestically or in the region. Increasing amounts are, however, being seized in continental Europe and the UK. The South African Police regularly spray cannabis with herbicide in SA, in Swaziland and Lesotho.

Drug Flow/Transit. Significant amounts of cocaine reach South Africa from South America. While there are no exact statistics available, cocaine is regularly available in South Africa's major cities, while the amounts seized oscillate between recent highs of 635.9 kilograms in 1998 and lows of 78.4 kilograms in 1993. This year's (2003) level of 210 kilograms is lower than the level of last year's (286 kilograms), but higher than the levels of the 4 previous years. South Africa, once a transshipment country, has become a user country with its own flourishing market. The consumption of cocaine, both powder and crystalline (“crack”) is on the increase. The production of synthetic drugs within South Africa's borders is also on the increase, according to the South Africa Police Service.

According to South Africa's Institute for Security Studies, of an estimated 100,000 Nigerian residents in South Africa, only 4,000 are legal. Many illegal Nigerian and West African residents in South Africa are involved in organized crime, specializing in the smuggling of crack cocaine. Car hijackers, for instance, whether Nigerian or other nationalities, take cars abroad, exchange them for drugs and come back to South Africa with drugs which can also finance other crimes. Nigerian gangs have also been found using South Africa as a base of operations for worldwide drug smuggling and the so-called 419 Fraud. In “419 Fraud” criminal groups from Nigeria offer the prospect of huge, windfall payments—in exchange for a pre-payment or data that would permit free access to a target's bank account.

Many drug liaison officers, as well as the South African Police Service, believe that South Africa is becoming a place for traffickers to warehouse their stocks of various drugs before sending them on to other countries. They believe that criminals view South Africa as a “weak enforcement” option for such warehousing operations. South Africa also has excellent infrastructure—financial, transportation, communications—and enforcement efforts are not as strong as those at alternative warehousing sites

nearer to the cultivation/production sites of the drugs. The largest “warehousers” are organized crime groups of Nigerian, Venezuelan, Colombian and Chinese nationals.

Heroin is smuggled into South Africa from Southeast and Southwest Asia, with some onward movement to the U.S. and Europe. According to the UN, however, the majority of heroin trafficked into South Africa is intended for local consumption. Heroin consumption among South African youth has also increased markedly, particularly with the advent of smokable heroin. According to the UN, injecting drug abusers are not common in South Africa, but information in South Africa on drug abuse is starkly limited, and the real situation might differ quite sharply from the way it appears today. The most recent evidence available indicates that heroin injecting is increasing in South Africa. These indications give rise to further concerns about the spread of HIV/AIDS through shared needles. A recent prevalence study conducted with 8-11 graders across South Africa, by the Medical Research Council of South Africa, showed that 12 percent had used marijuana and a shocking 11 percent had tried heroin.

Domestic Programs. South Africa has had a long history of mandrax and “dagga” abuse; drug counselors have noted in the past two to five years large increases in the number of patients seeking treatment for crack and heroin addiction. General budgetary constraints have meant that SAG subsidies for non-government drug rehabilitation agencies have been cut over the last three to four years. There are many people seeking treatment who are unable to register with any program, and for those who manage to enter a rehabilitation program, available services are constrained by lack of resources. Treatment demand data shows that, from 1997-2000, patients presenting themselves for treatment reporting cocaine abuse in the form of both crack and powder increased from 1 percent to between 5-10 percent of all patients presenting themselves for drug abuse problems. Figures for 2003 (January to June), show that percentage as 8 percent for Cape Town, 5 percent in Durban, and 2 percent in Port Elizabeth. The prevalence study mentioned above shows a much greater percentage of youth abusing drugs than are seeking treatment.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs.

Bilateral Cooperation. Crime remains an important issue in South Africa. U.S. law enforcement officers from the DEA, FBI, and DHS successfully cooperate with their South African counterparts. The U.S. urges the SAG to strengthen its implementation of current legislation and its law enforcement system—and thus become able to prosecute more sophisticated organized criminal activities, including drug trafficking. In support of these objectives, the U.S. has provided material assistance and training for a wide array of South African law enforcement units including the South African Police Service, the Directorate for Special Operations, the Johannesburg, Tshwane and Durban Metro Police, Home Affairs, the South African Revenue Service and the Department of Correctional Services.

The Road Ahead. Although the SAG is committed to creating an effective legal and regulatory infrastructure to combat drug trafficking, and all other forms of organized crime, the process of implementing change is likely to be slow and uneven.

Swaziland

Swaziland continues to be a center for trafficking in Southern Africa. In 2003, authorities seized marijuana, heroin (brown sugar and Thai white), Ecstasy (MDMA), mandrax, and cocaine that were en route from Mozambique to South Africa. Marijuana is the main, if not only, drug cultivated in Swaziland. It is grown primarily in the Piggs Peak area, in the northwest of the country. Although cocaine and mandrax use appears to be growing among high school and university students, the vast majority of all drugs are destined for South Africa and elsewhere.

The Royal Swaziland Police Service (RSPS) does its best to eradicate marijuana crops and combat trafficking, but weak legislation and poor resources have prevented them from making more progress in these areas. For example, under Swaziland's outdated criminal code, ecstasy is not an illegal substance, and police can seize the drug but cannot arrest the holder. Furthermore, because prosecution for drug offenses is limited to possession, organizers and conspirators cannot be prosecuted unless they also possess drugs. As a result, the RSPS remains a reactive rather than a proactive force. During 2003, authorities seized Swazi marijuana that was destined for the U.S., UK, Europe, and Japan. Swaziland is a party to the UN Drug Convention. It has also signed, but has not yet ratified, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

There have been arrests of Anti-Drug Unit officers in the past year, but overall corruption appears to be minimal and not tolerated by commanding officers. As a matter of government policy and practice, Swaziland does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions. As for the production of designer drugs, there is no indication that these are manufactured in Swaziland, and no labs have been identified or arrests made. South African Police Service officials are training RSPS so that they may better assess, identify, and seize such operations if necessary in the future.

Syria

I. Summary

In 2003, the Syrian government continued to prioritize and devote significant resources towards combating the drug trade. Although drug seizures increased measurably and domestic usage was negligible, Syria remained an important transit country. Jordan and the Gulf States remained the primary destinations for drugs transiting Syria from Lebanon and Turkey. Syrian authorities reported a reduction in the amount of opium transiting Syria from Pakistan and Afghanistan to Turkey. The Syrian government cooperated with Lebanese authorities on successful opium and cannabis eradication programs in the Syrian-controlled Lebanese Biqa' Valley. The government continued its strong counternarcotics cooperation with neighboring Turkey and Jordan, and in 2003 initiated cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Syria's domestic drug abuse problem remained small, due largely to the active enforcement of existing laws and the cultural and religious norms that stigmatize substance abuse. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Most narcotics transiting Syria go to other parts of the Middle East and to Europe. Syria is a transit country for hashish, cocaine, and heroin, particularly from Turkey, but also from Lebanon. Syria is also a transit country for opium entering Lebanon from Afghanistan via Jordan.

Since Syria was removed from the Majors List in 1997, The U.S. continues to monitor Syria's efforts to suppress cultivation of poppies in the Biqa' Valley, as well as the effect of drugs transiting Syria to the U.S., and sees no evidence that cultivation of significant amounts of either opium or cannabis has resumed, despite initial reports to the contrary in 2001.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. In 2002 Syrian authorities prepared a draft decree, which was expected to be released in early 2003, that was to provide financial incentives of up to several million Syrian pounds (3 million SP=apx. \$57,309) to anyone providing information about drug trafficking and/or cultivation in Syria. The draft decree was not enacted in 2003 because of a lack of funding and there is no expectation that there will be sufficient funding to do so in 2004. On September 9, 2003, the Syrian government enacted anti-money laundering legislation (Legislative Decree Number 59) consistent with guidelines adopted at the 1998 Arab League General Assembly.

In 2003, for the first time, Syrian authorities initiated joint narcotics investigations with Saudi Arabia. Syrian and Saudi counternarcotics officials worked together in four cases to investigate the illegal transport of Captagon pills through Syria to Saudi Arabia.

Syria's antitrafficking law of 1993 calls for the death penalty for certain offenses. In practice, however, most death sentences are commuted and the maximum sentence imposed is 30 years imprisonment. There were no death sentences in narcotics-related cases in 2003. Many cases are pending under the antitrafficking law, and there are ongoing prosecutions of drug offenders. Syrian law permits the seizure of assets that are the proceeds of crime.

Accomplishments. Seizure rates of some illegal substances, including hashish, increased in 2003. Arrests and convictions for drug related offenses also increased. Within Syria, the Syrian authorities confiscated 36 kilograms of cocaine, 7 kilograms of opium, 1,863 kilograms of hashish, and 2.2

million Captagon pills. Syrian authorities reported the arrest of 3,505 individuals on narcotics-related charges in 2,360 narcotics-related cases in 2003.

In 2001, there were allegations that Syria did not use its authority in Lebanon to suppress drug cultivation in the Syrian-controlled Lebanese Biq'a Valley. In 2002 and 2003, however, the Syrian government cooperated with the Lebanese police on successful opium and cannabis eradication programs. In August 2003, approximately 7,235,350 square meters of cannabis fields were eradicated. In December 2003, Lebanese authorities, with the support of Syrian authorities, carried out raids in the Northern Biq'a valley which resulted in the arrest of 75 individuals (many of whom were wanted for drug violations) and the seizure of 200 kilograms of hashish and seven kilograms of heroin and cocaine.

Key border stations were staffed with personnel and specialized dogs trained in detecting concealed drugs.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Drug seizures increased in 2003. Syrian officials characterized cooperation on drug issues with neighboring Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon on narcotics issues as "excellent."

Corruption. In the past there have been unconfirmed reports of corruption among some Syrian military officials in Lebanon involving the issuance of passes permitting the free movement of goods and persons in return for bribes. The Syrian government has an Investigations Administration (Internal Affairs Division) responsible for weeding out corrupt officers in the counternarcotics unit and the national police force. The Investigations Administration is independent of both the counternarcotics unit and the national police and reports directly to the Minister of the Interior. According to Syrian authorities, there were no arrests or prosecutions of officers in the counternarcotics unit for corruption in 2003; Syrian authorities did not provide information on whether any investigations were conducted. As a matter of government policy and practice, Syria does not encourage or facilitate the illicit production or distribution of drugs or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions.

Agreements and Treaties. Syria is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and its 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Syria has signed, but has not yet ratified, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols.

Cultivation/Production. The Syria Government (SARG) has an effective counternarcotics system in place that has reduced cultivation and production in Syria to negligible levels.

Drug Flow/Transit. Drug interdiction remains the focus of the Syrian counternarcotics effort. Despite increased seizure rates, Syrian officials estimate that in 2003 the overall flow of narcotics transiting Syria and destined for other countries in the region was approximately the same as in 2002. Transshipment of narcotics from Turkey continues to represent the major challenge to Syria's counternarcotics efforts. The SARG's reported seizure statistics suggest that either the overall flow of narcotics has increased, or that SARG counternarcotics efforts have been more effective in seizing shipments of hashish and cocaine transiting through Syria to Europe and other Middle Eastern countries, of opium transiting from Afghanistan through Syria to Turkey, and of Captagon pills transiting from Turkey through Syria to Saudi Arabia.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Due to the social stigma attached to drug use and stiff penalties under Syria's strict antitrafficking law, the incidence of drug abuse in Syria remains low. The SARG's counternarcotics strategy, which is coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior, uses the media to educate the public on the dangers of drug use, and drug awareness is also part of the national curriculum for schoolchildren. The Ministry also conducts awareness campaigns through university student unions and trade unions.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. In meetings with Syrian officials, the U.S. continues to stress the need for diligence in preventing narcotics and precursor chemicals from transiting Syrian territory; the need to work with the Lebanese government on crop eradication programs and on dismantling drug laboratories in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon; and the necessity of terminating any involvement, active or passive, of individual Syrian officials in the drug trade.

Bilateral Cooperation. U.S. Embassy officials in Damascus and DEA officials based in Nicosia maintain an ongoing dialogue with Syrian authorities in the Counternarcotics Directorate. Additionally, high-ranking U.S. officials periodically share their views and recommendations with the Syrian ministries of Foreign Affairs and Interior. Syrian Ministry of Interior officials characterize cooperation with the Nicosia DEA office as excellent.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to encourage the Syrian government to maintain its commitment to combating drug transit and production in the region; to follow through on plans to enact anti-money laundering legislation; and to improve its counternarcotics cooperation with neighboring countries.

Tanzania

I. Summary

Tanzania is located along trafficking routes from Asia and the Middle East to South Africa, Europe and the United States. Drugs like hashish, mandrax, cocaine, heroin and opium have found their way into and through Tanzania's porous borders. In addition, the domestic production of cannabis is a significant problem. As a result, drug abuse, particularly involving cannabis, as well as cocaine and heroin, is gradually increasing, especially among younger, more affluent people and in tourist areas. In 2002, Parliament ratified a Protocol on Combating Drug Trafficking in the East Africa region, and the cabinet endorsed a national Drug Control Master Plan. Institutions nonetheless still have minimal capacity to combat drug trafficking; corruption reduces that capacity still further. Tanzania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and in conjunction with UNODC, is seeking to address objectives of that convention.

II. Status of Country

Until 1989, Tanzania's contact with drugs was largely limited to the traditional cultivation of cannabis in some parts of the mainland. Since then, economic liberalization has brought increased affluence to the expatriate community and some urban Tanzanians. This affluence has driven demand for new drugs like mandrax, cocaine, heroin, and opium, which have found their way into and through Tanzania's porous borders.

In addition, the domestic production of cannabis is growing. Drug abuse among younger people is increasing, particularly abuse of the more affordable substances like cannabis and mandrax. Hard drugs like heroin and cocaine, including some crack cocaine, are used in small quantities within the affluent classes. The growth of the tourism industry, particularly in Zanzibar, has created a larger demand for narcotics.

Tanzania is located along trafficking routes with numerous possible illegal points of entry. The drugs originate from Pakistan, India, Thailand, Burma, Iran, Syria and South America en route to Europe, South Africa and to a lesser extent, the U.S. The amount of drugs transiting Tanzania does not, however, significantly affect the United States. Drugs enter Tanzania by air, sea, roads and rail. Major points of entry include airports in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Kilimanjaro, and sea ports at Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, as well as smaller ports like Tanga and Mtwara.

During the year, there were reports of "mules" carrying hard drugs to various African destinations via regional flights. It is widely believed that traffickers conduct a significant amount of narco-smuggling off-shore in small "dhow" boats that never stop in ports. In June of 2003, the Tanzanian Revenue Authority announced a program to install modern equipment and improve surveillance of major entry points. Anecdotal evidence suggests surveillance at the airports has improved, which may have the effect of driving trafficking to minor ports and unofficial entry points.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. In 1995, Tanzania passed the Prevention of Illicit Traffic and Drugs Act, which establishes severe punishments for the production and trafficking of narcotics. It stipulates long sentences, including life imprisonment and forfeiture of property derived from or used in illicit trafficking. Offenses under this act are not bailable. In 2003 the House of Representatives in Zanzibar passed their own Prevention of Illicit Traffic and Drugs Act, which puts Zanzibar narcotics law and sentencing in line with that of the mainland.

Accomplishments. Law enforcement officials have increased their efforts to combat narcotics trafficking, but still made only sporadic seizures during the year. Eradication of cannabis cultivation was more successful—over 111,000 kilograms of cannabis sativa were seized and destroyed in 2002, and police expect similar statistics for 2003.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Tanzania has increased its counternarcotics police force to nearly 75 officers in three branches located in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and Moshi. Additionally, over 300 regional officers throughout the country have received counternarcotics training. However, because of the still limited training and operational capabilities of its counternarcotics officers, Tanzania's efforts against narcotics are narrowly focused on street pushers and not effective at limiting narcotics trafficking. Senior Tanzanian counternarcotics officials acknowledge that their officers are under-trained and under-resourced. For example, the harbor unit lacks modern patrol boats and relies on modified traditional wooden dhows to interdict smugglers. As a result of the lack of training and resources, Tanzanian officers and police staff do not effectively implement profiling techniques and seize large amounts of narcotics. Narcotics interdiction seizures generally result from tip-offs from police informants. Moreover, low salaries for law enforcement personnel provide a good deal of impetus to engage in corrupt behavior.

On the positive side, formal cooperation between counternarcotics police in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Tanzania is well established, with bi-annual meetings to discuss regional narcotics issues. This cooperation has resulted in significant increases in communication as well as effectiveness in each nation's narcotics control efforts.

According to the most recent statistics, in 2002, the Criminal Investigative Police reported seizure of a total 2,461 grams of cocaine, 1,461 grams of heroin, 1,500 grams of mandrax, 850 grams of morphine, and 1,866 kilograms of cannabis resin. In addition, 111,511 kilograms of locally grown cannabis sativa were seized in a large-scale effort to eradicate cannabis plantations throughout the country. In 2003, police reported that four “swallowers” were apprehended at airports, three carrying pellets of cocaine and one carrying heroin. Full statistics for 2003 are not yet available.

Corruption. Pervasive corruption continued to be a serious problem in the Tanzanian Police Force. It is widely believed that corrupt officials at airports facilitate the transshipment of narcotics through Tanzania. In a highly publicized case, one customs officer was arrested and charged with corruption. The case is still pending. As a matter of government policy, however, the country does not encourage or facilitate illicit production or distribution of narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances, or the laundering of proceeds from illegal drug transactions, nor does any senior official of the government encourage such activities.

Agreements and Treaties. Tanzania is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Tanzania also has signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Drug Control, and the Protocol on Combating Drug Trafficking in the East African Region, which seeks to strengthen regional counternarcotics cooperation within the region, and also with Interpol, UNDCP and the International Narcotics Board. The Southern African Development Community, of which Tanzania is a member, has approved an counternarcotics action plan with the following objectives: 1) acquire information about drug use and trafficking in the region; 2) inform policy makers about the drug situation; and 3) develop legal frameworks to counteract drug use and trafficking. The 1931 U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty is applicable to Tanzania.

Cultivation and Production. Traditional cultivation of cannabis takes place in remote parts of the country, mainly for domestic use. No figures exist, but police and government officials report that production continues to increase. Given the availability of raw materials, and the simplicity of the process, it is possible that some hashish is also produced domestically. Police have seized equipment used to manufacture mandrax from clandestine laboratories in Dar es Salaam, suggesting continued

effort to establish domestic production. Most other illegal drugs imported into Tanzania are probably produced elsewhere.

Drug Flow/Transit. Due to its location and porous borders, seaports and airports, Tanzania has become a significant transit country for narcotics moving in sub-Saharan Africa. Control at the ports is especially difficult as sophisticated methods of forged documents combine with poor controls and untrained and corrupt officials. Afghan heroin entering Tanzania from Pakistan is being smuggled to the U.S. by Nigerian traffickers in small quantities. Traffickers from landlocked countries of Southern Africa, including Zambia, use Tanzania for transit. The port of Dar es Salaam is a major entry point for mandrax from India headed towards South Africa.

Domestic Programs/Demand Reduction. Tanzania traditionally was believed to be only a transit point for narcotics, but signs point to an increase in consumer use, particularly of the lower cost drugs. The spillover from trafficking and increased tourism both have contributed to an increase of domestic demand. The tourist industry has brought ecstasy (MDMA) to Zanzibar, and police reports confirm that crack cocaine is available locally. The Government of Tanzania has no programs to reduce demand for illegal narcotics.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. U.S. policy initiatives and programs for addressing narcotics problems in Tanzania are focused on training workshops and seminars for law enforcement officials. State Department law enforcement assistance includes funding the establishment of a forensics lab and training in its use. At the Tanzanian government's request these facilities will include narcotics analysis capabilities. The State Department's counterterrorism bureau is funding the "PISCES" program to improve interdiction capabilities at major border crossings. While the program targets terrorist activities, it has implications for narcotics and other smuggling as well.

The Road Ahead. U.S.-Tanzanian cooperation is expected to continue, with a focus on improving Tanzania's capacity to enforce its counternarcotics laws.

Togo

I. Summary

Togo is not a significant producer of drugs and its role in the transport of drugs is primarily regional. During 2003, however, the drug trade in Togo increased substantially. The Togolese drug trade is overshadowed, and to some degree dominated, by Nigerian traffickers. Lome remains a spoke in the Nigerian hub of narcotics trafficking and money laundering. Togo's ability to address the transnational flow of drugs is undercut by its stalled democratic transition, and the resultant suspension of most international development aid. The installation of an enormous cargo scanning x-ray machine in October 2003 at the Lome Autonomous Port, part of an agreement between the Government of Togo (GOT) and a Swiss company named COTECNA, will noticeably improve Togo's ability to intercept drugs and illegal chemical substances arriving in Togo by sea. Togo is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Drug abuse by Togolese citizens and crimes resulting from drug abuse were not numerous enough to constitute a threat to society in Togo in 2003. There are three agencies responsible for drug law enforcement: the police, the gendarmerie, and customs.

The only locally produced drug is cannabis and approximately 1-2 metric tons are seized each year. Heroin and cocaine, while not produced in Togo, are available, coming through the Port of Lome from South America and Afghanistan. In October 2003, police destroyed 893 kilograms of drugs which had been seized during the period of June 2002 until October 2003: 883.5 kilograms of cannabis valued at \$81,000, 1.775 kilograms of cocaine valued at \$81,000 and 6.085 kilograms of heroin valued at \$335,000. Lome serves as a transit point for drugs on their way to Nigeria, Burkina Faso, northern Ghana, and Niger. Togolese are not significant consumers. The great majority of smugglers are Lebanese or Ibo Nigerians. Togolese buy small amounts and sell to expatriates living in Lome. From January to November 2003, 42 people—of whom 35 were Togolese—were arrested for drug distribution: 37 men and 5 women. During the same period, 41 people were tried for narcotics-related crimes.

Togo's long and relatively porous borders permit narcotics traffickers easy access/egress. This relatively easy movement through Togo has made Togo a transit point for narcotics such as cocaine and heroin. Most narcotics trafficking arrests in Togo have involved Nigerian nationals traveling from Asia to other West African destinations. The prevalence of widespread official corruption facilitates the drug traffic.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. A master plan to counter narcotic trade was developed under the auspices of the Narcotic Control Coordinating Committee(CNAD). The Ministry of Interior appealed to members of the public to denounce illegal users and traffickers of drugs. In April 2003, Ghana and Togo created joint security units at the borders of Mognori, Kulungugu, and Pulimakom to combat drug and arms trafficking across the border.

Law Enforcement Efforts. The number of arrests increased somewhat in 2003. Only occasional spot checks are made of passengers at the airport. The new cargo screening ability at the Port of Lome will, however, aid the interdiction of drugs arriving by sea. Arrests have been most numerous at the land

border crossings and in Lome. Arrests are sometimes made after a tip, but are more often made in the course of other routine law enforcement activities, such as traffic security or customs checks.

The greatest obstacles that the GOT faces in apprehending drug distributors are the government's lack of computer technology, lack of communication and coordination, and mutual distrust among the three agencies responsible for drug law enforcement. There is no reporting, record keeping or cross-agency communication process.

Corruption. The Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) made no drug-related arrests of government officials and, to USG knowledge, no government officials are involved in the drug trade. Unsubstantiated rumors abound that unnamed officials in various GOT agencies can be bribed to allow illicit narcotics to transit to or through Togo.

Agreements and Treaties. Togo is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention. Togo cooperates with other members of ECOWAS (Economic Community of West Africa) regarding law enforcement issues. Togo has signed, but has not yet ratified, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cultivation/Production. The only drug cultivated in quantity is cannabis, which can be grown in all five of Togo's regions. Cultivation is primarily for local demand although some cross border distribution by small-scale dealers is suspected.

Drug Flow/Transit. There are sizeable expatriate Nigerian and Liberian populations involved in the drug trade, and they arrange for drug transshipments from many places in the world, through Africa, and onward to final markets. Many observers of drug trafficking in West Africa believe that hard drugs like cocaine and heroin are "warehoused" in the region, before being dispatched to final consumption markets.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The CNAD opened a youth counseling center that shows films and sponsors counternarcotics discussion groups. The programs have been well attended by NGO's, religious groups, and school groups composed of parents, teachers, and students. Programs designed for high school students focused heavily on prevention/non-use. The CNAD also sponsored programs for security forces that stressed the link between drug use and HIV/AIDS.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Policy Initiatives. The primary goal of the U.S. is to help the GOT combat the international trafficking of drugs. The U.S. seeks to help the GOT in improving its ability to interdict illicit narcotics entering Togo and to prosecute those traffickers who are caught. Togo's emerging willingness to confront the issue of illicit drugs is hampered by the country's ongoing democratic transition and the weak state of GOT finances.

The Road Ahead. U.S. cooperation with Togolese counternarcotics officials will continue. USG funded narcotics assistance will be used for Togolese counternarcotics infrastructure improvements.

Tunisia

I. Summary

Tunisia is not a significant drug transshipment country. The government has an active youth demand reduction education program and encourages NGOs' counternarcotics educational activities. Tunisia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and its domestic law contains the legislative provisions mandated by the Convention.

II. Status of Country

Tunisia is neither a significant drug transshipment point nor a significant producer of precursor chemicals. Tunisia is a transit point for individual smugglers taking small amounts of hashish from Morocco to Europe. The government does not publish figures for narcotics consumption. NGOs active in the field report drug consumption is limited, but has increased in recent years, primarily at high schools, universities, and tourist resorts. There is a negligible amount of illicit cultivation of cannabis in northern Tunisia. Before Tunisia gained its independence, cannabis was cultivated legally for local use.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Accomplishments. The Government of Tunisia (GOT) continues to give a high priority to counternarcotics law enforcement. Tunisian media reported that law enforcement authorities seized a small amount of drugs, mostly hashish, and arrested a handful of drug abusers and traffickers in 2003. Hard drugs remain difficult to find or buy in Tunisia. Counterterrorism legislation containing money laundering provisions was passed in December 2003.

Policy Initiatives. In December 2003, the Tunisian Parliament passed law no. 94/2003 criminalizing support and financing to individuals, organizations, or activities related to terrorism, including the laundering of money for this purpose.

Law Enforcement Efforts. Tunisian authorities did not make publicly available comprehensive information on counternarcotics law enforcement. Media occasionally reports on law enforcement efforts to break up small rings of Tunisian hashish traffickers and to arrest cannabis users.

Corruption. In 2003 Tunisia had no publicized cases of public narcotics-related corruption. There is not any explicit or implicit official support for narcotics-related activities.

Agreements and Treaties. Tunisia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Tunisia is also a party to the UN Convention against Transnational Crime and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, supplementing this convention.

Cultivation/Production. There is negligible cultivation and production of illicit drugs in Tunisia. Some cannabis is grown in northern Tunisia.

Drug Flow/Transit. Tunisia is not a major drug transshipment country. There are regular reports of individual hashish smugglers from Morocco who transit Tunisia en route to Europe.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). The GOT conducts drug education programs in schools and encourages NGOs to conduct complementary educational programs. There is not a large addict population in Tunisia.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to work closely with Tunisia to improve narcotics law enforcement. The U.S. supports Tunisian efforts to comply fully with the 1988 UN Drug Convention, and it seeks Tunisian support for U.S. international counternarcotics initiatives.

United Arab Emirates

I. Summary

Although not a narcotics-producing nation, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is believed to be a transshipment point for traffickers moving illegal drugs from the major drug-producing countries, especially Afghanistan, westward. Frequent reports of seizures of illegal drugs in the UAE during the past year underscore this conclusion, although most seizures have been of “soft” drugs like hashish, not “hard” drugs like heroin. Besides the country's general laissez-faire attitude toward trade—although not drugs—there are several other factors that render the UAE a way-station, including its proximity to major drug cultivation regions in Southwest Asia, a long (700 kilometers) coastline, and relative affluence among the local population.

Published statistics on narcotics seizures and domestic addiction reveal a growing drug problem among UAE and third-country nationals, which is notable given the country's harsh drug laws. A Ministry of Health report in late 1998 asserted that there were approximately 12,500 drug addicts in the country of 3.1 million people. The UAE is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

A major regional financial center and hub for commercial shipping and trade, the UAE is a transshipment point for illegal narcotics from the drug-cultivating regions of southwest Asia, to Europe and the United States. Western Europe is the principal market for these drugs. Statistics on drug-related cases released by the UAE government (UAEG) indicate that the majority of arrests for illegal trafficking occur in the northern emirates. Factors that contribute to the prominence of the northern emirates are the emergence of Dubai and Sharjah as regional centers in the transportation of passengers and cargo, a porous land border with Oman, and the fact that a number of ports in the UAE are de facto “free ports”—transshipped cargo are not subject to inspection, as are other goods that enter the country.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. The UAE continued in 2003 to advance its national drug strategy based on intensifying security at the country's air and sea ports and patrols along the coastline, reducing demand of illegal drugs through educational campaigns, enforcing harsh penalties, and rehabilitating drug addicts. The UAEG is studying a proposal to establish a federal General Directorate to replace the existing federal committee for fighting drugs. This reorganization, if approved, would mean additional manpower and a larger budget to wage the war on drugs.

The UAE's Federal Supreme Court issued an important ruling in 2003 regarding proof that drug-offenders actually consume drugs in the UAE before they can be prosecuted. The Supreme Court decided that UAE law enforcement officials could not prosecute drug-users if the consumption took place in another country. A positive blood test for drugs is considered evidence of consumption, but does not determine whether the drug-taking occurred in the UAE or abroad.

Law Enforcement Efforts. In 2003, the UAE Ministry of Interior established a countrywide database that is accessible to emirate-level police departments. This is a major step forward in coordinating narcotics-related information throughout the UAE.

Punishment for drug offenses is severe; a 1995 law stipulates capital punishment as the penalty for drug trafficking. No executions, however, have ever taken place, and sentences usually are commuted

to life imprisonment. In November, the Dubai Supreme Court handed a death sentence to two of six drug smugglers who set fire to a boat containing cannabis, as the Anti-Narcotics Squad approached them off the Dubai coast. The rest of the gang received life sentences. According to police, the six smugglers were carrying more than 800 kilograms of cannabis on board their boat.

Several other high-profile seizures in 2003 indicate that UAE authorities continue to take seriously their responsibility to interdict drug smuggling and distribution. In June, Dubai authorities seized a shipment of 350 kilograms of opium from a dhow belonging to an Iranian trader. International news wire services reported the event as “the largest ever” seizure of opium in the UAE. As of mid-2003, 525 people had been arrested in the UAE on drug-related charges.

The UAE signed a landmark counternarcotics agreement with Iran in 2003 providing for cooperation against production, distribution, and smuggling of illicit drugs across the UAE-Iran sea border. Press reports note that UAE and Iranian border forces will work together to identify smuggling routes, and jointly conduct some counternarcotics training in 2004. UAE police attended a series of UN-sponsored counternarcotics training programs in Iran in 2003.

Organized crime is not a major security threat in the UAE, but the very public assassination of an infamous Indian gangster and suspected drug-runner in Dubai in January forced the UAE authorities to acknowledge the existence of organized crime in the UAE. Further anecdotal evidence suggests that a Russian mafia is growing increasingly influential in prostitution and the narcotics trade. In 2003, UAE authorities worked to dismantle the activities of Indian and Russian gangs, and extradited a number of henchmen back to their native countries to stand trial.

Corruption. UAE officials aggressively pursue and arrest individuals involved in illegal narcotics trafficking and/or abuse. There is no evidence that corruption, including narcotics-related corruption, of public officials is a systemic problem.

Agreements and Treaties. No extradition or mutual legal assistance treaties (MLAT) exist between the United States and the UAE, although the two countries are exploring whether to negotiate an MLAT. The UAE is party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1961 UN Single Convention as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and the 1988 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances. The UAE has signed, but has not yet ratified, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Cultivation/Production. There is no evidence of drug cultivation and/or production in the UAE.

Drug Flow/Transit. Narcotics smuggling from south and southwest Asia continues to Europe and—to a significantly lesser degree—the United States via the UAE. Hashish, heroin, and opium shipments originate in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran and are smuggled in cargo containers, via small vessels and powerboats, and/or sent overland via Oman. The UAE, and Dubai in particular, is a major regional transportation and shipping hub. High volumes of shipping render the UAE vulnerable to exploitation by narcotics traffickers. UAE authorities recognize that the number of human carriers of illicit narcotics transiting local airports is also on the rise. Dubai police foiled 83 attempts to smuggle drugs through Dubai International Airport in 2002. The police also caught a number of traffickers trying to smuggle drugs over the UAE land border by truck and horseback.

Recognizing the need for increased monitoring at its commercial shipping ports, airports, and borders, the UAEG is making an effort to tighten inspections of cargo containers as well as passengers transiting the UAE. Customs officials and inspectors received specialized training on ferreting out prohibited items from U.S. DHS and Commerce's Bureau of Industrial Security in December 2003. Customs officials randomly search containers and follow up leads of suspicious cargo. Dubai Ports Authority purchased state-of-the-art equipment for rapid, thorough searches of shipping containers and vehicles.

Domestic Programs (Demand Reduction). To mark the occasion of International Anti-Narcotics Day on June 26, the UAEG released a report outlining the drug problem in the UAE. The report noted that the majority of UAE drug users take their first dose abroad, primarily because of peer pressure. Statistics reveal that 75 percent of drug users in the UAE prefer hashish, 13 percent use heroin, while 6 percent use morphine. The report illustrates a clear relationship between drug abuse and level of education—75 percent of arrested drug users in 2002 were high school graduates, but only 2 percent were university graduates. Local press reports the street value of one kilogram of Pakistani hashish to be an approximate 5,000 Dirhams (\$1,362) in Abu Dhabi and about 4,500 Dirhams (\$1,226) in Dubai. The price is said to be highest in Abu Dhabi and Dubai because the customer base in these two emirates tends to be more affluent.

The focus of the UAEG's domestic program is to reduce demand through public awareness campaigns directed at young people and the establishment of rehabilitation centers. UAE officials believe that adherence to Muslim religious mores as well as imposing severe prison sentences for individuals convicted of drug offenses are an effective deterrent to narcotics abuse. An affluent country, the UAE has established an extensive treatment and rehabilitation program for its citizens. There is a rehab center in Abu Dhabi, two in Dubai, and one each in Ajman and Sharjah for those identified as addicts. In accordance with federal law no. 1511995, UAE nationals who are addicted can present themselves to the police or a rehabilitation center and be exempted from criminal prosecution. Those nationals who do not turn themselves into local authorities are referred to the legal system for prosecution. Third-country nationals or “guest workers,” who make up approximately 80 percent of the UAE's population, generally receive prison sentences upon conviction of narcotics offenses and are deported upon completing their sentences.

Most UAE nationals arrested on drug charges are placed in one of the UAE's drug treatment programs. They undergo a two-year drug rehabilitation program, which includes family counseling/therapy. The Emirate of Ras Al-Khaimah announced in June that it would require former addicts to undergo a weekly blood test for an additional two years upon completing the drug treatment program. Ras Al-Khaimah authorities discovered that some resume taking drugs, even after completing the rehabilitation program. The police issue a search warrant for the drug addict if he or she misses a scheduled blood test.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S. Policy Initiatives. The U.S. Mission to the UAE seeks continued and enhanced participation by the UAEG in programs dealing with narcotics trafficking, precursor chemicals diversion, border/export control, and money laundering. The U.S. Embassy in Abu Dhabi and the Consulate in Dubai in 2003 organized, in conjunction with Washington-based agencies, additional training initiatives related to money laundering, border/export control, and the investigation and prosecution of related crimes.

The Road Ahead. The USG will continue to support the UAEG's efforts to devise and employ bilateral/ multilateral strategies against illicit narcotics trafficking and money laundering. The USG and UAE are actively considering whether to negotiate an MLAT treaty, which would facilitate the exchange of information related to drug and financial crimes. The USG will encourage the UAEG to focus enforcement efforts on dismantling major trafficking organizations and prosecuting their leaders, and to enact export control and border security legislation.

Zambia

I. Summary

Zambia is not a major producer or exporter of illegal drugs, nor is Zambia a significant transit route for drug trafficking. Zambia's Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC) reported a dramatic ten-fold increase in seizures of cannabis in 2003 over the previous year. Seizures of other drugs remained small compared to most other countries, even though the DEC confiscated a much larger quantity of amphetamines this year (4 kilograms versus 19 grams last year). The DEC works closely with other Zambian law enforcement agencies and has a strong record of cooperation with foreign governments, including the U.S. As is true of the Zambian government generally, the DEC is hampered by a lack of resources. Zambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention.

II. Status of Country

Apart from small-scale cultivation of cannabis, Zambia is not a source of illegal drugs. Zambia is not an important route for drug shipments or a source of precursor chemicals. Almost all of the DEC's interdiction effort is related to cannabis. Measured by market value, cannabis accounted for 95 percent of illegal drug seizures in 2003. According to the DEC, cannabis is typically cultivated in Zambia by subsistence farmers who plant it alongside other crops grown for food and income. Most of Zambia's cannabis crop is exported to other countries.

Eradication of cannabis is one of the DEC's main enforcement goals, and it has a program in place for this purpose. Other DEC programs focus on training of officers, drug demand reduction, and money-laundering investigations. Following Zambia's enactment in 2001 of the "Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Bill," the DEC has taken the lead among Zambian law enforcement agencies for investigating and prosecuting money laundering.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Policy Initiatives. In 2003, the DEC intensified its outreach efforts to schools. DEC officers have now given presentations at every primary school in Lusaka province.

Law Enforcement Efforts. DEC statistics show a dramatic increase in seizures of cannabis and amphetamines. The DEC reports confiscation of 114 metric tons of cannabis from January through November of 2003, versus 16 metric tons for all of 2002. During the same period, the DEC confiscated four kilograms of the amphetamine methaqualone (mandrax), compared to just 19 grams in 2002. An important contributing factor to the increase in seizures was the improved professional capacity of DEC officers, achieved in part through USG training programs. Drug-related arrests increased slightly in 2003. There were 3,534 through November, compared with 3,288 in the first ten months of 2002. Of the persons arrested for drug offenses in the first eleven months of 2003, 115 were foreign nationals. Of these, 23 came from the Democratic Republic of Congo, 21 from Tanzania, and 7 from Zimbabwe.

Corruption. In 2003 the Government of Zambia continued an important new initiative to curb corruption among public officials. While the DEC has played a central role in this initiative, especially through its anti-money laundering unit, these efforts have been general good government initiatives and have had no direct relationship to narcotics control. No evidence has emerged to suggest that current government officials are involved in production or trafficking of drugs.

Agreements and Treaties. Zambia is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the 1971 UN Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol. A 1931 extradition treaty between the U.S. and the UK governs extraditions from Zambia.

Drug Flow and Transit. In 2003 there was no evidence that large quantities of drugs flowed through Zambia to other jurisdictions. In the first months of 2003, the DEC intercepted only 1.5 kilograms of heroin and just over 50 grams of cocaine.

Domestic Programs. The DEC's demand-reduction effort consists mainly in education programs carried out in schools and the workplace. The government has no specialized facilities for drug treatment. DEC officials report that there are fewer than 200 known addicted users of drugs in Zambia.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

Bilateral Cooperation. The U.S. provides significant training assistance to Zambian law enforcement agencies, including the DEC. In 2003 over one hundred Zambian law enforcement officers, at least a quarter of whom are active in narcotics control, completed training at the U.S.-sponsored International Law Enforcement Academies in Gaborone, Botswana and Roswell, New Mexico.

The Road Ahead. The U.S. will continue to work with Zambia's government and law enforcement officials in the area of narcotics control.

Zimbabwe

I. Summary

Zimbabwe is not a major producer, supplier, or exporter of drugs or precursor chemicals. Cannabis remains the biggest drug problem in Zimbabwe, with the majority (80 percent) being imported from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia, while the remainder is home grown. Cocaine has risen to be the second most popular drug in Zimbabwe, overtaking Ecstasy. For many of the drugs being tracked (cannabis, cocaine and heroin), Zimbabwe is a transshipment point on the route to other countries. Although Zimbabwe is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention and ratified the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol, a unified government program of prevention and enforcement remains largely unfunded and inactive.

II. Status of Country

Production, cultivation, and trafficking in illicit drugs in Zimbabwe are considered rather limited, as is the production of precursor chemicals. Although cannabis is cultivated in the rural areas on a small scale for local use, it remains the biggest drug problem in Zimbabwe, with the majority of cannabis (80 percent) being imported from Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia. A large percentage of the drug is re-exported to Botswana and South Africa. Cocaine has risen to be the second most popular drug in Zimbabwe, overtaking Ecstasy. Cocaine is predominately smuggled in from Brazil and other Latin American countries. Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) report that “the bulk” of the cocaine imported is re-exported to other countries.

Ecstasy is predominately consumed in the rave/night club party scene and is imported from the Netherlands, Britain, and South Africa. Hashish, heroin, and LSD have also been noted in very limited quantities in larger urban areas such as Harare, Bulawayo, and Gweru. Unaffordable to the mainstream population, these drugs are generally used by affluent suburban youths. Due to its location along established routes, Zimbabwe has also been identified as a transshipment point for mandrax (methaqualone), a synthetic drug produced in India and Pakistan for distribution primarily in South Africa.

Law enforcement authorities are not presently engaged in specific programs to combat drug use, production, or transshipment and view the counternarcotics effort as minor in comparison with other law enforcement challenges that they routinely face.

III. Country Actions Against Drugs in 2003

Zimbabwe is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, as well as the SADC Protocol. Zimbabwe has signed, but not yet ratified, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. While the five-year Zimbabwe Drug Control Master Plan was formulated in 2000, it has yet to be implemented by the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ). In a recent report by the ZRP, they described their drug enforcement activities as an “absence of meaningful drug seizures and noteworthy arrests.” Nevertheless, offenders continue to be prosecuted in the courts. Narco-money laundering does not appear to be a problem and there are no known indicators to demonstrate or suggest that government officials are engaged in or encourage illicit drug production or distribution.

IV. U.S. Policy Initiatives and Programs

The U.S. Government neither conducted nor proposed any counternarcotics policy initiatives in Zimbabwe during the past year. Zimbabwe's overall problems with illicit drugs are relatively small, certainly in comparison with many neighboring countries, but unfortunately it appears the GOZ's counternarcotics efforts continue to be sidelined by a more pressing, yet controversial, political agenda.

The Road Ahead. Internal political difficulties dominate events in Zimbabwe. Re-integration into more intense international cooperation against narcotics trafficking awaits resolution of Zimbabwe's political difficulties.

